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Preface 
The present study on the European Commission’s provision of budget 
support is based on a report prepared for the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and submitted to the 
ministry in January 2005. A comprehensive analysis of the EC’s budget 
support had become necessary because, among other things, the way in 
which the instrument is handled had come in for criticism from various 
quarters in Germany. The present study works out the central elements of 
the EC’s budget support concept, examining it in terms of the objectives 
envisaged for and the risks entailed by budget support. The study further-
more looks into whether and to what extent the concept is in fact being 
implemented in the EC’s budget-support programs. The study’s aim is to 
assess the EC’s performance as a donor in the provision of budget support. 
In preparing the study, the author evaluated 30 financing proposals for 
budget support as well as a comprehensive body of other documents and 
conducted numerous interviews, with, among others, partners at the Direc-
torate General for Development (DG DEV) and the EuropeAid Co-
operation Office (AIDCO), the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the GTZ, the KfW, and the GFA. 
The author also took two field trips to Ethiopia and Mozambique in order 
to analyze some of the initial experiences gained in program implementa-
tion. She would like to take the present opportunity to extend her heartfelt 
thanks to her many interview partners as well as to the representatives of 
the European delegations in the two countries named; without their active 
cooperation this study would not have been possible. 
In essence, the following text reflects the state of the information available 
in January 2005. In a small number of cases the text has been updated or 
altered to render it more precise. 
 
 
Bonn, August 2005              Petra Schmidt 
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Executive summary 
In recent years budget support has become an increasingly important 
instrument in the European Commission's development cooperation 
(DC). A clear-cut rise in the use of budget support has been noted above 
all in the Commission's cooperation with ACP countries. Between 2000 
and 2004 commitments for budget-support operations more than dou-
bled, recently reaching a level of nearly 21 % of new European Devel-
opment Fund (EDF) commitments. Furthermore, the Commission has 
announced that it will further increase or at least maintain the volume of 
budget support. By the end of 2003, 33 of the 77 ACP countries had 
received EC budget support. 
Provision of budget support is a contentious issue in the international 
debate on development cooperation (DC). While its proponents argue 
that the departure from the project-based approaches of the past has 
served to boost ownership and improve the effectiveness, efficiency, 
and significance of DC, its critics point to the high risks involved in 
providing budget support. In view of inadequate public financial man-
agement (PFM) systems in most recipient countries, they note, it is 
impossible to rule out substantial misuse or misappropriation of DC 
funds. 
Against this background it has become evident that, taken by itself, the 
transition to budget support cannot offer any guarantee of more effec-
tive and efficient development cooperation. On the one hand, the suc-
cess or failure of the instrument depends on recipient governments’ 
competence in policy formulation and strategy development as well as 
on the political parameters in partner countries. On the other hand, it is 
the responsibility of donors to undertake whatever efforts they can to 
coordinate their contributions with partner programs with a view to 
realizing the potential benefits of budget support and to put measures in 
place to effectively assess and limit existing risks. This has served to 
center the discussion on the operational design of budget-support pro-
grams. 
The transition to budget support in EC development cooperation 
As one of the world's largest donors, the EC constantly sees itself faced 
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with the challenge of optimizing the efficiency and quality of the devel-
opment assistance it provides. Evaluations of Community development 
instruments and programs conducted in the late 1990s revealed a num-
ber of performance-related weaknesses. At the same time, the interna-
tional development debate was increasingly concerned with new forms 
of DC. due to growing pressure to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of DC in a situation marked on the one hand by a lack of success in 
efforts to reduce poverty and on the other by scarcity of DC funds. 
It was in particular the project approach adopted by many donors that 
was criticized as inefficient for not being aligned with coherent national 
reform strategies, for generating little ownership on the partner side, and 
for giving rise to high transaction costs for partners and donors alike. 
More and more thought is now being given to the possibility of counter-
acting these negative effects by focusing more on program-based ap-
proaches (PBAs). Program-based approaches represent direct and coor-
dinated support for a locally owned development strategy or program, 
relying mainly on existing partner structures to relieve the strain on 
scarce partner-country capacities and to reduce transaction costs. One 
way to achieve this is by providing budget support. 
Communications of the European Council and the European Commis-
sion (EC) in 2000 clearly indicate the Community's will to support part-
ner programs and to be guided by them. Since then the EC has pursued 
a strategy involving a departure from projects and a transition to PBAs, 
and in particular to budget support. In the EC's view, general budget 
support is the most efficient modality of aid delivery in order to reduce 
poverty and generate sustainable economic growth Accordingly, general 
budget support is provided principally to support macroeconomic poli-
cies and comprehensive poverty-reduction strategies (PRSs) of partner 
countries. 
Macroeconomic budget support is the default mode of Community 
budget support (ahead of sector budget support), and the approach is 
replacing the structural adjustment support of the 1990s. The latter was 
marked by substantial weaknesses, in particular as far as partner country 
program ownership, improvement of social service delivery for the 
poor, and poverty reduction were concerned. In the form in which it is 
operated today, budget support is focused primarily on effecting real 
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improvements for disadvantaged population groups and on making 
concrete progress in poverty reduction. Budget support may thus be 
seen as a reflection both of the international debate and of Community 
experience with structural adjustment support. 
Eligibility criteria for budget support 
The EC, one of the main proponents of budget support, itself concedes 
that the instrument entails risks, although the EC notes at the same time 
that this applies for other forms of DC as well. Many of these risks, it 
adds, can be predicted and controlled by restricting budget support to 
countries that meet certain eligibility criteria. In its development coop-
eration with the ACP countries the EC conditions budget support on the 
following basic eligibility criteria: 
— There must be macroeconomic stability in the recipient country. As 
evidence, the country must have adopted and be implementing a 
macroeconomic program supported by a major international donor. 
Generally speaking, this will be linked to a loan from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth Fa-
cility (PRGF). 
— There must be a clear political will in the recipient country to re-
duce poverty. Implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa-
per (PRSP) or some other poverty reduction strategy is deemed 
reasonable proof. 
— The recipient country must accept progress assessment based on per-
formance indicators. 
— Sufficiently transparent, efficient, and effective public financial 
management systems in the recipient country are required. 
These eligibility criteria are fundamentally in line with the precondi-
tions set by other donors for budget support. In view of the high fiduci-
ary risks associated with budget support, the fourth criterion is particu-
larly relevant to ensuring that the funds provided are used in appropriate 
ways. The EC does not demand a flawless system of public financial 
management, however. Instead of serving as an exclusion criterion, 
weaknesses in public financial management are seen as a challenge to 
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be addressed in connection with the provision of budget support. This 
view is derived from the logic of program-based approaches, the aim of 
which is precisely to strengthen existing partner capacities and to pro-
mote the development of efficient administrative structures. Increasing 
the transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency of public  financial man-
agement is thus at the same time both the condition for and the objective 
of budget support. 
Key characteristics of the EC's budget-support concept 
With a view to ensuring that its eligibility criteria are met and that the 
potential benefits of budget support are fully utilized, the EC developed 
a comprehensive program concept for budget support and incorporated 
it in the budget-support guidelines it adopted in 2002. The EC's budget 
support is marked by the following central characteristics: 
— As a rule the EC's budget support is direct and untargeted, i.e. the 
support provided is channeled directly to the recipient govern-
ment’s single treasury account for budget implementation and is 
not earmarked for any specific use. 
— The EC’s budget support programs are normally designed for three 
years in order to increase predictability. EC budget support is dis-
bursed in several tranches, with a distinction made between fixed 
and variable tranches. Normally, a fixed and a variable tranche will 
be released each financial year. Disbursement is conditioned on the 
implementation of a macroeconomic reform program and on good 
results on performance indicators, respectively. 
— The aim of budget support is to assist partner countries in imple-
menting their PRSPs. This requires the programs to be aligned ma-
terially and procedurally to national PRSP and budget calendars. 
— The ECs budget support replaces traditional ex ante conditionality 
with performance-based ex post conditionality. The link between 
performance and disbursement is established through a gradual 
disbursement mechanism. 
— Priority is accorded to overall assessment and improvement of 
partner public financial management systems. 
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— In this respect donor coordination has become more important than 
ever before. 
Application of the guidelines in the course of program implementation 
A conclusive evaluation of the way in which the EC's budget-support 
guidelines have been implemented will only be possible once programs 
have been in operation for a number of years. The same applies for 
anticipated benefits, such as increased ownership, reduction of transac-
tion costs, etc. However, the financing proposals on budget support 
negotiated and approved by the EDF provide some first indications on 
the use of the guidelines. As regards the key characteristics, the follow-
ing picture emerges: 
— The transition from indirect, targeted budget support to direct and 
untargeted provision has now been concluded. All budget support 
programs approved by the EDF in 2003 have been direct and un-
targeted. 
— There is a clear-cut trend toward long-term programs. A three-year 
period has been set for all budget support programs approved in 
2003. This serves to increase predictability and contributes to con-
tinuous reform processes in partner countries. 
— The model based on fixed and variable tranches is now generally 
accepted. In 2003, for the first time, all EC financing proposals for 
budget support provided for disbursement in the form of fixed and 
variable tranches. In 2003, nearly 50 % of programmed funds were 
earmarked for the variable "performance bonus." The other half of 
these funds is disbursed in fixed tranches. 
— There is scope to improve the alignment of budget support to the 
PRSP and budget process. This applies in particular for the vari-
able tranche, which is often calculated only after the government’s 
budget has been prepared. Also, many tranches are disbursed not at 
the beginning but toward the end of the financial year. However, 
insufficient alignment of budget support to budget calendars is not 
an exclusive problem of the variable-tranche model. It is just as 
likely to be due to insufficient dovetailing of the PRSP and budget 
processes in recipient countries on the one hand as well as to the 
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generally inadequate alignment of donor support to national pro-
cesses on the other. 
— The need to materially align budget support to partner PRSs calls 
for program conditionalities that are derived from national strate-
gies. Thus far the EC's conditionalities have not been comprehen-
sively harmonized with national goals and objectives, a fact which 
is due, among other things, to difficulties partner countries have in 
formulating appropriate PRS indicators. 
— The use of performance-based ex post conditionality is making 
good headway, though there would be room to expand it. Even in 
2003 programs were still being approved that conditioned dis-
bursement of the fixed tranche not only on macroeconomic reform 
programs but on other policy measures as well. In addition, the in-
troduction of performance-based elements in the variable tranche 
does not mean that all indicators are outcome indicators: The prob-
lems involved in defining outcome indicators for public financial 
management make it appear unlikely that process conditionalities 
will be abandoned for the variable tranche, and in fact this would 
not be recommendable, either. 
— Use of the system of graduated disbursement as a means of linking 
performance and payment has proven its worth in practice. It has 
been found practicable to condition disbursement on a balanced set 
of goals and objectives that neither strain nor underchallenge part-
ner capacities. In the years 2001 and 2002 an average of 70 % of 
the maximum amount of variable tranches was disbursed. As ex-
perience has shown, the variable tranches work in favor of a more 
pronounced outcome orientation among partners. 
— There is still considerable room for improvement as regards ap-
praisal of public financial management systems. More attention 
should be devoted to the possibilities of both ex ante and continu-
ous assessment of partner PFM systems. The same goes for the use 
of compliance tests prior to and during program implementation, a 
practice that has thus far been provided for in only a very limited 
number of programs. 
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Future challenges 
Notwithstanding certain discrepancies between program design and 
implementation, which should be further reduced, the following areas 
are turning out to be crucial to the success of the EC's budget-support 
programs: 
— The importance of public financial management for successful 
poverty reduction on the one hand and the need to limit fiduciary 
risks on the other are now widely recognized. Numerous ACP 
countries, with the support of donors, have started to implement 
comprehensive reforms designed to incrementally improve their 
public budgets and financial management systems. This is a com-
plex and long-term process, and some recipient countries are still 
struggling with substantial weaknesses as regards the transparency, 
effectiveness, and efficiency of their public financial management. 
It is the task of the donors, and thus of the EC as well, to continue 
to provide support for the implementation of these reforms, and to 
do so in the framework of concerted donor action. This calls for a 
continuous process of assessment and reporting on progress on re-
forms on which financing decisions and targeted technical support 
can be based. 
— The EC's performance-based budget-support concept hinges on 
sound data and indicators that can be used to measure progress in 
poverty reduction and the provision of social services. Even after 
recipient countries have devoted two or three years to the imple-
mentation of their PRSPs, the PRS monitoring systems in numer-
ous countries are still at the design stage. It would, therefore, be 
important to undertake targeted efforts to ensure that sound moni-
toring is conducted; these might include e.g. support for the statis-
tics departments of line ministries and agencies. Sound monitoring 
systems are the only reliable way to systematically identify weak-
nesses in the implementation of poverty-reduction programs and to 
consistently align budget-support to partner programs. 
— Despite considerable progress, donor coordination in the frame-
work of PBAs remains a challenge. This goes in particular for the 
coordination of program conditionalities. As initial experiences in-
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dicate, the EC is willing to relinquish some of its influence in favor 
of a coordinated approach. Even so, with its outcome-oriented 
conditionality the EC is pursuing an approach that has received 
only partial backing by many other donors, including in particular 
the World Bank, which bases its Poverty Reduction Support Cred-
its (PRSCs) on policy measures (prior actions). One main concern 
here is to avoid transaction costs for recipient countries and to co-
ordinate conditionalities, e.g. by embedding different donor con-
cepts in a common policy matrix. 
— Provision of budget support in no way lessens the need of technical 
cooperation (TC). In partner countries, implementation of national 
strategies and reform agendas is often undercut by capacity bottle-
necks at the implementation level. It should, though, be noted that 
support for comprehensive reforms places new demands on TC 
that in part differ substantially from those involved in a project-
based approach. Thus far the debate in the EC on PBAs has mainly 
been concerned with the instruments of financial cooperation in the 
form of sectoral or general budget support. With the aspect of sus-
tainable partner capacity-building in mind, the formulation and im-
plementation of flanking TC measures should be accorded greater 
attention, without losing sight of the need for an approach closely 
coordinated with other donors. 
Conclusions for German development cooperation 
Conclusions for German DC can be drawn in two areas: On the one 
hand, Germany, as an EU member state, is directly involved in EC 
budget support. On the other hand, Germany, as a bilateral donor, must 
seek to define a position of its own toward EC budget support. 
As a EU member state, Germany has a voice in deciding on EC budget 
support approvals, prior to which it receives all financing proposals for 
comment. If they are to review these financing proposals on budget 
support in a more targeted way, the staff of both the BMZ and the Ger-
man implementing agencies must have sound knowledge of the EC's 
budget support concept. Particular attention should be accorded to as-
sessing the eligibility criteria that a partner country is required to meet 
to qualify for budget support. Ultimately, this assessment has implica-
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tions for bilateral German DC, since it would be difficult to question a 
country's eligibility for budget support at the bilateral level once it has 
been deemed eligible for budget support at the supranational level. 
In contrast to the more general eligibility decision, assessing the quality 
of individual program elements of the EC's budget-support financing is 
only possible and reasonable on the basis of specific country knowl-
edge. In particular, the task of assessing indicators and targets requires 
information that goes beyond knowledge of the EC's financing propos-
als, and acquiring such data is often a costly and time-consuming effort. 
The desire to assess, and if need be to influence, the design of individual 
programs should therefore be weighed critically with a view to input 
and yield. 
Unlike program approval, program implementation is not a subject 
addressed at EDF meetings. If member states are to have at least rudi-
mentary knowledge of program implementation, it would make sense 
for disbursement data to be provided periodically (e.g. semiannually), 
particularly as concerns data regarding the calculation of the variable 
tranche. Germany should seek to ensure that the EC in fact makes this 
information available. 
As a bilateral donor, Germany should in the future look into the possi-
bility of cooperating more closely with the EC. In donor groups the EC 
has proven to be a reliable and competent lead partner in the field of 
budget support. The criteria on which it bases its provision of budget 
support are in line with those of other donors, and as a general rule these 
criteria are conscientiously observed. Viewed against this background, it 
would be reasonable to support an enlargement of Germany's engage-
ment to include cofinancing of EC budget support programs. At present 
the German TC/FC guidelines provide only for cofinancing of the 
World Bank's PRSCs. German participation in multidonor budget sup-
port groups without a close link to a PRSC is not formally intended, 
though in it would be practice possible after consultation with the minis-
tries concerned. Cofinancing of EC budget-support programs in terms of 
PRSC cofinancing is neither mentioned in the TC/FC guidelines nor 
practiced. 
However, it would be important to examine whether and to what extent 
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the concept of cofinancing might be abandoned in favor of an autono-
mous participation of German DC in budget support programs. In the 
view of political decision-makers, it is in particular the high fiduciary 
risks involved in the provision of budget support that speak against any 
enlargement of general budget support and for restriction to PRSC cofi-
nancing. Despite the assumed risks, this reserve must be regarded with a 
critical eye in view of the major leverage effects that an individual do-
nor can achieve with the instrument of budget support. 
What concrete shape should be given to German participation in donor 
groups, and whether delegated cooperation in the sense of a closer 
alignment to the EC's budget-support program might prove reasonable – 
these are questions that would have to be answered on a case-by-case 
basis. Against the background of the EC's experiences, we can derive 
the following recommendations for German DC: 
— Even for “small” budget-support donors it is important to reflect on 
possible links between disbursement and performance and to seek 
to develop an adapted, graduated system of allocation. 
— Viewed against the background of the need to improve the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of aid, it would appear reasonable to con-
centrate on performance indicators. Clearly measurable perform-
ance-based conditionalities contribute to more objective disburse-
ment decisions. 
— However, the choice of performance indicators and the evaluation 
of goals and objectives set by recipient governments call for active 
participation in discussions bearing on developments in the sectors 
concerned. One question that needs to be clarified is whether Ger-
man DC is in a position to mobilize the necessary capacities on the 
ground, or whether – e.g. – it might be more reasonable to adopt, to 
one extent or another, the indicators used by the EC. 
— In order to take part effectively in the policy dialogue and accom-
pany reform processes in recipient countries, it would be recom-
mendable to strengthen German DC on the ground by developing 
expertise on the PRSP process, public financial management, and 
macroeconomic issues in recipient countries. Together with the 
BMZ, the German implementing agencies should develop concepts 
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suited to adapting their external structures to the new challenges. 
This goes in particular for the priority partner countries of German 
DC. 
— The task of providing comprehensive assessments of recipients’ 
public financial management systems requires donors to develop 
expertise. German DC should thus intensify its efforts to build ca-
pacities in the field of public budgets and financial management, 
not least with a view to becoming involved in important thematic 
fields within donor groups. 
 

Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation 
German Development Institute  13
1 Introduction 
There is an international consensus that the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) can only be achieved if both official development assis-
tance (ODA) is increased sharply and development cooperation and its 
instruments and modalities become more efficient and effective. With a 
view to increasing the efficiency of ODA, aid donors are increasingly 
providing direct and coordinated support for broad political programs and 
strategies in recipient countries (program-based approaches / PBAs), with 
existing partner structures being used to relieve the strain on partner-
country capacities and to reduce transaction costs. National budgets – and 
outside support for them – figure prominently in the debate. One way to do 
this (to support budgets) is to provide budget support or other joint financ-
ing mechanisms. 
The European Commission is one of the most important advocates of 
budget support – along with the World Bank, the UK, and the Netherlands. 
Since 2000 the Commission has pursued a strategy involving a departure 
from projects and a transition to PBAs, and in particular to budget support. 
„The Commission considers budget support as one of the most efficient 
modalities of aid delivery and the one that is most likely to significantly 
contribute to growth, improving financial management, reducing pover-
ty and economic restructuring.“1 
The use of budget support has increased markedly in recent years, above 
all in development cooperation with ACP countries. According to recent 
figures, budget support has accounted for over 23 % of new commitments. 
While the proponents of budget support argue that the shift away from the 
project-based approaches of the past serves to boost ownership and raise 
the efficiency and significance of DC contributions, its critics point to the 
high risks associated with the provision of budget support. In view of 
inadequate public financial management (PFM) systems in most recipient 
countries, it has been noted, it is impossible to rule out substantial misuse 
or misappropriation of DC funds. Even its main proponents concede that 
provision of budget support entails risks, although they note at the same 
time that this applies for other forms of DC as well. Many of these risks, 
                                                          
1 EC (2004a, 4). 
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they add, can be predicted and controlled. In the end, it is noted, a weigh-
ing of the risks and chances of budget support indicates that the instrument 
offers the potential to provide a substantial contribution to reaching the 
MDGs in a situation of scarce resources. 
Against this background it has become evident that, taken by itself, the 
transition to budget support cannot offer any guarantee of more effective 
and efficient development cooperation. On the one hand, the success or 
failure of the instrument depends on recipient governments’ competence in 
policy formulation and strategy development as well as on the political 
parameters in partner countries. On the other hand, it is the responsibility 
of donors to undertake whatever efforts they can to coordinate their con-
tributions with partner programs with a view to realizing the potential 
benefits of budget support and to putting measures in place to effectively 
assess and limit existing risks. This has served to center the discussion on 
(the) operational design (of) budget-support programs.  
The present study looks into the budget support provided in the framework 
of Community development aid.2 The study works out the central elements 
of the EC's budget-support concept, examining them in the light of the 
goals they aim to achieve and the risks they entail. It furthermore looks 
into whether and to what extent the concept has in fact been adopted and is 
being practiced in the EC's budget-support programs. The aim is to evalu-
ate the performance of the European Commission, qua donor, in the provi-
sion of budget support. 
One of the reasons why it had become necessary to conduct a comprehen-
sive analysis of the EC's budget support was that the way the instrument 
has been handled has come in for criticism from various quarters in Ger-
many. In particular, two arguments are cited in this connection: 
— The main reason for providing budget support is to speed up the out-
flow of funds. 
— The EC's preparatory work for budget-support operations is not ade-
quate and insufficient attention is paid to implementation. The result 
is that budget support is granted without any reasonable certainty that 
the eligibility criteria recognized by other donors have in fact been 
                                                          
2 The aim, structure, and contents of the study follow the TOR agreed on with the BMZ; 
see Annex 1. 
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met by the recipients governments (poverty-reduction strategies, sat-
isfactory quality of public financial management, etc.). 
There is, however, little evidence to back these assertions. Nor is it clear 
whether this criticism is due to general skepticism toward PBAs and 
budget support or whether it distinguishes between the EC and other pro-
viders of budget support. 
The way in which budget support is embedded in Community DC has an 
important role to play in evaluating these criticisms leveled at the EC. 
Chapter 2 of the present study for this reason takes a close look at the 
debate within the EC that has led to the increased use of the instrument of 
budget support and discusses the legal foundations on which budget sup-
port is based, checking them against the conditions set by other providers 
of budget support. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the financial and budgetary scope of 
budget-support programs, discussing the issue in the context of the prob-
lem complex implied by the above-mentioned, alleged interest in speeding 
up outflows of funds. Chapter 4 then goes on to outline some of the central 
characteristics of the concept of budget support and to examine the extent 
to which these are accorded due consideration in the preparation of financ-
ing proposals on budget support. In this connection the study looks into 30 
of the 50 financing proposals adopted by the European Development Fund 
between 2002 and 2003. The analysis focuses on two examples of budget-
support programs (Ethiopia and Mozambique) with a view to gleaning 
some first experiences made with the instrument. Chapter 5 then sums up 
the study's most important findings, drawing conclusions for German DC. 
The EC's provision of budget support in its DC is an issue relevant in 
particular in the framework of its cooperation with ACP countries. As far 
as the EC's other regional programs are concerned, budget support has 
either long since proved its value as a instrument (MEDA) or is still in its 
incipient phase (ALA). Other EC programs (TACIS, CARDS, Phare) 
provide only in part for budget support. The study for this reason concen-
trates on EDF financing operations, focusing in particular on general 
budget aids as a core area of EC budget support. 
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2 Provision of budget support in the framework of 
European development cooperation 
2.1 Reorientation of European development cooperation: 
support for program-based approaches and emphasis 
on budget support 
Alongside trade policy and the general political dimension, development 
policy is one of the three principle pillars of the European Union's external 
activities. The EC plays an important role in international cooperation and 
development assistance. Together with its member countries, the EC ac-
counts for 65.7 % of the official development assistance (ODA) provided 
worldwide as well as for over two thirds of outright grants.3 The European 
Community bears the political and financial responsibility for more than 
10 % of the overall official development assistance provided worldwide, 
which means that that the Community has nearly doubled its percentage 
share of ODA since 1985. 
As one of the world's largest donors, the EC constantly sees itself faced 
with the challenge of optimizing the efficiency and quality of the devel-
opment assistance it provides. Evaluations of Community development 
instruments and programs conducted in the late 1990s revealed a number 
of performance-related weaknesses.4 The Community's development-
assistance system was found to be adversely affected by a number of 
overly complex and highly fragmented procedures. Strategies were gov-
erned more by instruments than by clearly defined priorities, and staff 
levels were inadequate to the task of managing the volume of funding 
involved. Critical comments from both the OECD's Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) and other quarters confirmed this assessment, 
noting that Community development policy lacked a coherent strategy and 
sufficient focus.5 This gave the impetus for a wide-ranging reform of 
European development cooperation that has been underway since 2000 
and has extended to both the formulation of new political guidelines and a 
course of extensive administrative reform. 
                                                          
3 As of 2003; see http/www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/61/31504039.pdf. 
4 See EC (1998), EC (1999), COWI (1998). 
5 See OECD / DAC (1998, 12). 
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The core of this reorientation may be seen in the EC's communication on 
the European Community's development policy, which was issued in April 
2000. The communication amounts to a comprehensive overall develop-
ment-policy concept geared to poverty reduction. It was followed by a 
joint declaration by the Council and the Commission emphasizing poverty 
reduction as the paramount objective of Community assistance.6 With a 
view to increasing the impact of development cooperation and overcoming 
the fragmentation referred to above, Council and Commission defined six 
priority fields of action on which future Community aid is to concentrate.7 
This choice of fields of action was based on two main criteria: First, they 
must be deemed appropriate to contribute to poverty reduction and sus-
tainable development; second, these must be fields in which the Commu-
nity enjoys a comparative advantage over other donors. Aside from this 
substantive focus, the intention is to improve the efficiency of develop-
ment cooperation by reorganizing the procedures and modalities of exter-
nal aid as well as by enhancing coordination, complementarity and coher-
ence. Building on the statements made by Council and EC, the Commu-
nity adopted, in May 2000, a detailed reform program8 that found concrete 
expression in a program of action presented in 2001.9 
The guidelines on the Community's development policy not only respond 
to the weaknesses of community aid, they may also be seen as a reflection 
of the international debate underway since the mid-1990s on a range of 
issues that may be summed up under the header of "aid effectiveness." In 
view of the lack of success of previous efforts to reduce poverty and gen-
erate sustainable growth, the discussions are now concerned with ways to 
boost the effectiveness of DC as well as with possible instrumental ad-
justments required for the purpose. 
One view that figures high in the ongoing general discussion is that the 
project approach pursued by many donors is marred by substantial draw-
                                                          
6 See Council of the European Union (2000). 
7 The priority fields of action are 1) trade and development, 2) regional integration und 
cooperation, 3) support for macroeconomic policies, with explicit reference to poverty-
reduction strategies, 4) transportation, 5) food security und rural development, and 6) 
institutional capacity-building and good governance. 
8 See EC (2000b). 
9 See SEC (2001). 
Petra Schmidt 
 German Development Institute 18
backs.10 These include the low reach of "project islands," limited project 
sustainability once donor funding is discontinued, overly high transaction 
costs on both the partner and the donor side, and weak partner ownership, 
due for the most part to a one-sided orientation of DC contributions to 
donor priorities. Furthermore, donor-dominated parallel structures became 
entrenched and projects contributed little to building institutional and 
administrative capacities in partner countries. But ambitious development 
goals like poverty reduction and economic growth cannot be reached in 
the absence of effective governmental structures. 
Against this background numerous recipient countries and donors have 
come out in favor of gearing bi- and multilateral development cooperation 
more to partner priorities and programs and making better use of existing 
structures. They see program-oriented DC and harmonization of donor 
contributions as a good way to boost the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
significance of development cooperation. There are also plans to gauge 
DC in terms of the results of development-related measures instead of 
inputs (results orientation) as well as to continuously track the poverty 
orientation of programs. 
The communications of Council and EC clearly indicate the Community's 
will to support partner-country programs and to be guided by them.11 In 
this context national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which 
have now been presented by 42 countries12 and are used as the basis for 
elaborating the EC's country strategies, serve as the most important frame 
of reference for development cooperation. The concept of partnership-
based relationships is accorded particular importance in this connection. 
Government programs, and thus PRSPs as well, constitute a set of princi-
ples and lines of action that are further concretized only in the course of 
implementation.13 One essential element of the EC's general willingness to 
contribute to and support such strategies is an intensive dialogue geared to 
ensuring coherence between the policies of a partner country and the ac-
                                                          
10 This goes above all for countries with a high ODA/GDP or ODA/budget ratio. 
11 "The Community is therefore determined to support poverty reduction strategies which 
integrate these many dimensions and are based on the analysis of constraints and oppor-
tunities in individual developing countries." Council of the European Union (2000, 11). 
12 As of December 2004. 
13 See GTZ (2004, 12). 
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tivities of the Community as well as to providing the space needed to spec-
ify strategies in the course of their evolution. Both the Council and the 
Commission see the quality of dialogues with partner countries as the key 
to successful development cooperation and they both define the concept 
"partnership" as a principle of Community aid.14 
Consistent support for the strategies of recipient countries also calls for 
new aid modalities. The debates surrounding program-based approaches 
have sensitized the development community to what is known as the fun-
gibility of DC. DC is referred to as fungible when the aid provided enables 
partner countries to reduce their own expenditures in one place in order to 
use the funds for other purposes. Experience shows that project-based 
approaches have neither obviated the fungibility problem nor had any 
marked influence on partner-government priorities. Only in the framework 
of a partner country's overall budget is it possible to monitor whether do-
nor funds are being used fungibly and what spending priorities a recipient 
country is pursuing. Many donors have therefore spoken out in favor of 
centering their activities on the budgets of recipient countries and seeking to 
influence the allocation of funds by means of cross-cutting approaches or 
sector programs. The financing modalities that have been proposed range 
from general budget support to sectoral budget aids and other mechanisms 
of joint financing (Fig. 1). In the international discussion joint measures are 
commonly referred to as basket-funding or common pools.15 In the frame-
work of joint financing a number of donors provide financial resources for a 
fund or pool which is administered on the basis of standardized procedures 
(reporting, etc.). Depending on donor-side capacities, the use to which these 
funds are put can be decided on by the donors, the partner concerned, or by 
both together – which is likely to be the normal case.16 
The new orientation of the EU's development cooperation entails a shift in 
the set of instruments used in Community aid. The EC sees a need to con-
centrate on budget support and sector programming as a means of enhanc-
ing the effectiveness and quality of its development policy.17 The Council 
                                                          
14 See KOM (2000a, 31). 
15 See e.g. Word Bank (2002, 33); EC (2003b, 48 ff.). 
16 See Klingebiel (2003, 8). 
17 See EC (2000b, 37). 
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has expressly declared both direct budget support and sectoral budget aids 
to be the preferred instruments of Community aid:  
"The Commission has initiated a reshaping of its external aid manage-
ment. This approach must have implications for Community aid instru-
ments. The introduction of rolling programming […] and increased re-
course to sectoral support and to direct budgetary aid where the condi-
tions so allow and where subsequent monitoring may be introduced are 
likely to help to lead to more efficient management and a more efficient 
allocation of resources."18 
Thus the EC has joined the group of donors who show a clear-cut trend 
toward program orientation. Many partner countries welcome this change 
in the thrust of DC and are expressly calling on the donor community to 
support their strategies by providing financing contributions for sector 
programs or budget support (Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, and oth-
                                                          
18 See Council of the European Union (2000, 8). 
Figure 1: Financing modalities for PBAsa 
Traditional project-financing 
? 
Project-specific contributions to a partner program 
? 
Project-specific contributions to a partner program with donor-harmonized  
procedures and standards 
? 
Joint financing of a donor-controlled basket 
? 
Joint financing of a jointly controlled (donor or partner) basket 
? 
Joint financing of a partner-controlled basket 
? 
Sector budget support 
? 
General budget support 
a Categories after Foster / Leavy (2001); Asche / Lauckner (2002); Klingebiel (2003, 13) 
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ers).19 In recent years budget support has become an increasingly impor-
tant instrument of Community aid, one used principally to support partners 
with their economic policies and PRSs.20  
2.2 The transition from structural adjustment aid to 
macroeconomic budget support 
The transition to program orientation is more marked in some priority 
fields of Community aid than in others. One field of action that plays a 
particularly important role in connection with PBA and the use of budget 
support is "support to macroeconomic policies with an explicit link with 
poverty reduction strategies, in particular sector programs in social areas 
(health and education)". The EC generally provides budget aids to support 
macroeconomic programs, while projects continue to be transacted via the 
traditional contractual procedures and financing lines (Fig. 2). It should be 
noted here that the focus on macroeconomic strategies in European devel-
opment cooperation is nothing new. In the early 1990s the Community 
provided substantial funds in support of partner-country macropolicies and 
structural adjustment programs. 
The reason for this must be sought in proliferating economic disequilibria 
in numerous partner countries. In the early 1980ths many ACP countries 
were faced with sizable budget and balance-of-payments deficits, which 
they financed by running up foreign debts not commensurate with their 
growth prospects. With a view to overcoming these problems and restor-
ing economic equilibrium, the countries concerned embarked, under the 
aegis of the Bretton Woods Institutions, on a course of extensive structural 
adjustment. The intention was to reduce their deficits at the domestic 
(budget) and external (balance of payments) level by implementing a 
number of macroeconomic measures and restructuring their public expen-
diture. The European Community participated in this process. The 4th 
Lomé Agreement, whose Articles 243 to 250 provide for a support instru-
ment for structural adjustment, created the legal basis for Community fi-
  
                                                          
19 The government of Mozambique has called on donors e.g. to raise the budget-support 
share of ODA to 60 %. 
20 See OECD / DAC (2002, 1-46 f.). 
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nancing of economic reforms in the ACP countries.21 Since then support 
for structural reforms has become an integral component of the Commu-
nity's technical and financial cooperation with partner countries in the 
ACP and MEDA regions.22 By the end of 2002 the Commission had made 
payments totaling € 2.3 to 42 ACP countries in support of reforms on 
                                                          
21 The 4th Lomé Agreement (Lomé IV) was signed on 15 December 1998 and took effect 
in 1990 for a period of 10 years. In addition, a five-year supplementary financial proto-
col was adopted for the 7th EDF. At mid-term, in November 1995, Lomé IV was revis-
ed and enlarged to include an additional five-year financial protocol for the 8th EDF. 
22 Support for structural reforms played a lesser role in cooperation with Asian and Latin 
American countries (ALAs) in the 1990s, and the current ALA Regulation (1992) does 
not provide for a structural-assistance instrument. 
Figure 2: Forms of DC and financing modalities for EU development  
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which they had reached agreements with the BWIs. Between 1992 and 
2000, in the framework of the MEDA program, the Community earmarked 
a total of € 600 for SAFs in the Mediterranean countries.23 
The experiences made with the Community's structural adjustments aids 
are quite complex. There is no doubt that Community programs have con-
tributed to consolidating the macroeconomic equilibrium in partner coun-
tries and supported them in the process of structural adjustment. Even so, 
substantial weaknesses have been identified, in particular as far as partner-
country program ownership, improvement of social services for poorer 
population groups, and poverty reduction are concerned.24 Similar deficits 
were noted for the structural adjustment loans provided by the IMF and the 
World Bank. In 1999 it was disappointment over the lack of success in the 
field of poverty reduction that gave the impetus to develop the PRSP con-
cept. Comprehensive poverty-reduction strategies were made into a core 
instrument of debt relief in the framework of the highly indebted poor 
countries (HIPC) initiative. The BWIs at the same time conditioned their 
concessional lending on the preparation of PRSPs by partner countries. In 
replacing its former structural adjustment credit with the new Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), the World Bank raised poverty reduc-
tion to the level of an objective and criterion of the success of its pro-
grams. The IMF in turn replaced its expanded structural adjustment facil-
ity with its PRGF. 
The EC was took part in the discussions of the most important donors and 
adapted its aid to the altered perspective of and the new challenges facing 
the ACP countries. Based on an EC document reviewing the prospects of 
Community support for structural adjustment,25 the Community has, since 
2000, granted budget support geared more strongly to effecting real im-
provements for disadvantaged population groups and to achieving progress 
in poverty reduction. The EC's comments on support for structural adjust-
ment were supplemented by assessments provided by the Council and the 
                                                          
23 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2002, 12 f.). 
24 See Rat Entwickung (2000, 11); Europäischer Rechnungshof (2001b). 
25 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Community support for economic reform programmes and structural adjustment: review 
and prospects," 04.02.2000, EC (2000) 58 final. 
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European Court of Auditors.26 All share the view that the handling of the 
instrument was in need of adjustment in view of a more pronounced pro-
gram orientation and the associated, growing role played by budget sup-
port in this connection. With the Cotonou Agreement and the MEDA 2 
Regulation, the European Union initiated a new era in its support of eco-
nomic reforms in partner countries, defining the legal framework for the 
provision of budget support. 
2.3 Legal basis and preconditions for the provision of 
budget support 
The framework agreements on cooperation with partner countries (MEDA 
2 Regulation and Cotonou Agreement) stipulate the eligibility criteria for 
budget support. One exception is the ALA Regulation,27 which makes no 
explicit reference to macroeconomic and budget support. The basis for 
support of macroeconomic reform programs in the ALA countries is there-
fore the Council's recommendation of 18 May 2000, which comes out in 
favor of support for economic reforms in all developing countries, includ-
ing the ALAs. Furthermore, the Commission’s Communication on Com-
munity support for economic reform programmes and structural adjust-
ment28 which recommends the use of budget support, forms the basis for 
Community support of macroeconomic reforms in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. 
The partnership agreement between the EU and 77 African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific countries, adopted in June 2000, is exemplary for the reorien-
                                                          
26 Council - DEVELOPMENT (2000): Protocol of the 2236rd Council meeting – DEVE-
LOPMENT – 8571/00 (presse 156), Brussels 18.05.2000; European Court of Auditors 
(2001a): Special Report No 5/2001 on counterpart funds from structural adjustment 
support earmarked for budget aid (seventh and eighth EDFs), together with the Com-
mission's replies (2001/C 257/01); European Court of Auditors (2002): Special Report 
No 1/2002 concerning macrofinancial assistance (MFA) to third countries and structural 
adjustment facilities (SAF) in the Mediterranean countries, together with the Commis- 
sion's replies. 
27 See Council of the European Union (1992). 
28 See KOM (2000c). 
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tation of Community aid in the sense of program orientation.29 The agree-
ment underlines the equality- and partnership-based nature of the Commu-
nity's cooperation with the ACP countries and provides for the use of 
budget support as a flanking measure for macroeconomic and sectoral 
reforms.30  
The Cotonou Agreement stipulates that partner countries must meet the 
following preconditions to be eligible to receive budget support:31  
— There must be macroeconomic stability in the recipient country. As 
evidence, the country must have adopted and be implementing a mac-
roeconomic program supported by the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Generally speaking, this will be linked to a loan from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF). 
— There must be a clear political will in the partner country to reduce 
poverty. Implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) or a comparable strategy for poverty reduction are deemed 
reasonable proof. 
— Sufficiently transparent, efficient, and effective budget management 
in the recipient country is required. The government must have a 
clearly articulated will to embark on reforms and improve public fi-
nancial management. 
— The recipient country must accept evaluation of its progress on the basis 
of performance indicators. 
Considering the support provided thus far by the Community and the 
course of the international discussion, these conditions must be seen as 
reflecting a transition of Community aid to a second generation of reforms. 
The cross-cutting economic objective continues to be stable macroeco-
nomic frameworks in partner counties. "Macroeconomic budget support 
underpins structural reforms intended to ensure the viability of growth and 
                                                          
29 The central objectives defined in the agreement include poverty reduction, sustainable 
development, a step-by-step integration of the ACP countries into the world economy; 
these objectives had already been set out the Maastricht Treaty as goals of European 
DC. 
30 See Cotonou Agreement, Art. 67 and Art. 69 (see Annex 2 of the present study). 
31 See EC (2004a, 3). 
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equality."32 Consolidation of a macroeconomic framework conducive to 
economic growth is seen as a necessary condition for reducing poverty. It 
deserves to be emphasized that for the Commission there can be only one 
macroeconomic reform program in place in one given country. This is the 
reason why Community aid provided in the framework of structural ad-
justment should be sufficiently coordinated with other donors, in particular 
with the BWIs and the EU member countries. Support is provided only for 
programs recognized and, if appropriate, backed by the most important 
multilateral donors. The EC's concern here is to assume, alongside the 
BWIs, a greater role in the reform dialogue with partner governments, 
without losing sight of the objectives and special features of Community 
aid.33 In the past the EC has played a particularly significant role in the 
international debate on the social impacts of economic reforms, to which it 
has made some important contributions. 
By requiring partner countries to work out national PRSPs or comparable 
strategies, the Community has moved poverty reduction to the center of 
macroeconomic reform programs. Its emphasis on partner-owned poverty-
reduction strategies may be seen as consistent with the call for a more 
pronounced internalization of programs. Poverty reduction is not only a 
goal in its own right, it is also a prerequisite for obtaining support of the 
population for reforms that are often painful.34 For the EC sustainable 
development centers on the sectors health and education, which are ac-
corded greater attention in nearly all Community macroeconomic budget-
support programs. However, it will only be possible to achieve real im-
provement in social services if key sectors are coordinated with the mac-
roeconomic framework in which they operate. It is for this reason both 
efficient and effective to include them in economic reform programs from 
the very outset.35 
For donors, a sound and efficient public financial management of the kind 
explicitly referred to in the Cotonou Agreement is a highly relevant factor 
                                                          
32 AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 15). 
33 See KOM (2000b, 33). 
34 See KOM (2000b, 2). 
35 See KOM (2000a, 29). 
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because of the high fiduciary risks36 involved in the provision of budget 
support. Article 61(2), § a), of the agreement conditions budget support on 
public financial management in partner countries that is "sufficiently 
transparent, accountable and effective." The article is generally interpreted 
as meaning that a minimum of transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency 
must be given in the public financial management of partner countries. 
However, far from being an exclusion criterion, weaknesses in public 
financial management are seen as a challenge to be addressed in connec-
tion with the provision of budget support. This view is derived from the 
logic of program-based approaches, the aim of which is precisely to 
strengthen existing capacities and to promote the development of efficient 
administrative structures. Increasing the transparency, effectiveness, and 
efficiency of public financial management is thus both the condition for 
and the objective of budget support.37 Accordingly, EC budget-support 
programs are designed to help partner countries build the capacities they 
need to develop an efficient administration as well as suitable control 
mechanisms.38 But improvements in public financial management are only 
possible when necessary reforms are accepted, supported, and managed by 
partner countries. This is why the European Commission cites the will to 
reform and improve partner financial administrations as a criterion for the 
provision of EC budget support in ACP countries. 
One factor of great importance in this regard is the conditionalities at-
tached to budget support. The point of conditionalities is to assess public 
financial management and to keep track of necessary improvements. In 
view of the fact that traditional conditionality typically imposed for struc-
tural adjustment programs proved to have substantial weaknesses, the  
Commission has replaced its conditionality policy with a performance-
based ex post conditionality. The new conditionality centers on the devel-
opment of performance indicators that are used to assess progress in part-
ner countries. The adoption of this eligibility criterion is in line with the 
Community's fundamental concern with enhancing the outcome orienta-
tion of DC, which has now become a Community priority. 
                                                          
36 The term refers to the risk that funds provided may not be used efficiently for the purpo-
ses for which they were intended or that they might be misappropriated. See GTZ / KfW 
(2003, 21), DFID (2004, 2). 
37 See Leiderer (2004, 3 f.). 
38 See Rat Entwicklung (2000, 13). 
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Unlike the Cotonou Agreement, the MEDA 2 Regulation does not explic-
itly address the quality of public financial management. The requisite 
eligibility criteria refer exclusively to the implementation of a BWI-
approved reform program, the economic situation of the country in ques-
tion, and sector reforms in general (Annex 1). In practice, however, provi-
sion of budget support in the Mediterranean countries as well is condi-
tioned on their implementation of cross-cutting poverty strategies and 
development of their systems of public financial management.39  
The eligibility criteria for budget support apply for both macroeconomic 
and sector budget support. The following section looks into how the EC 
defines these types of budget support. 
2.4 Macroeconomic and sector budget support 
Depending on the use for which it is intended, the Commission breaks 
budget support down into three different types (Fig. 3). Accordingly, mac-
roeconomic budget support is provided, first, in support of economic re-
forms and poverty reduction, second, as emergency aid for purposes of 
stabilization and rehabilitation, and third, as complementary ad hoc aid to 
mitigate short-term export fluctuations and to support regional integration 
projects. Both emergency aid and complementary ad hoc aid may be seen 
as special cases of macroeconomic budget support, whereas support for 
macroeconomic reforms constitutes the core of budget-support operations. 
It is important to distinguish between the regular instrument of macroeco-
nomic budget support and macrofinancial support (MFS), a special in-
strument which is provided to EU accession countries.40 
Budget support in the form of emergency aid is used to support countries 
that see themselves confronted with unanticipated financing bottlenecks in 
the wake of external or internal political or civil crises and natural disas-
ters. A pluriannual support program keyed to long-term reforms would not 
be appropriate in situations of this kind. What these countries need is 
short-term support to stabilize their budgets and reduce their deficits at 
                                                          
39 See AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 19). 
40 MFS is approved through specific Council decisions based on a EC proposal. As of the 
year 2000, nine countries had received MFS amounting to a total volume of € 822 milli-
on. See AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2000, 15). 
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both the internal (budget) and external (balance-of-payments) levels. As a 
rule emergency aid consists of one-year programs linked to a plan for 
economic reconstruction. Unlike World Bank and IMF, the Commission 
has not developed any special financing lines designed to mitigate crises 
and instead makes use of existing financing lines.41 
Complementary ad hoc supports are used to mitigate fluctuations in export 
revenues, and they are for the most part provided to ACP countries. In 
view of the fact that many ACP countries are forced to contend with un-
derdiversified economic structures and one-sided dependence on certain 
agricultural goods, fluctuations in their export revenues may endanger the 
                                                          
41 Funds from the B-envelope may be used for the ACP countries. 
Figure 3: Types of budget support in the EU's DC 
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implementation of macroeconomic and sector reform programs. Apart 
from exceptional support provided for reform programs in the wake of 
declines in export revenues, the Community also uses ad hoc budget sup-
port as a means of promoting regional integration programs. 
Budget aids provided in support of macroeconomic reforms are the core 
area of Community budget support. This goes back to the structural ad-
justment aids and the structural adjustment facility of the 1990s and, in its 
present form, reflects the Community's aim of improving the effectiveness 
of DC. In the international development discussion this type of budget 
support is usually referred to as general budget support. 
The Commission draws a line between macroeconomic budget support 
and budget aids provided to help implement coherent and donor-
coordinated sector policies and programs. Sector budget support is nor-
mally complementary to macroeconomic budget support, unless the coun-
tries concerned are found to have stable economic frameworks. "In prac-
tice, it is difficult to conceive of providing sector budget support in the 
absence of a macroeconomic reform programme."42 In contrast to this 
approach, many donors see the introduction of PBAs as a process provid-
ing for the step-by-step development of projects extending from joint 
financing to budget support.43 In other words, given unfavorable frame-
work conditions in a recipient country, a fund may e.g. be set up outside 
the budget, whereas in countries with a satisfactory sectoral financial ad-
ministration sector budget support may well prove to be the right approach 
prior to the point at which the transition is made to general budget support. 
The sectoral budget aid provided by the EC can be used in supports of 
SWAPs (sector-wide approaches) or for sectoral policies bearing on food 
security. In the view of the Commission, a SWAP is given if the following 
criteria are met:44 The country concerned has 
— an "approved sector policy document" and an "overall strategic 
framework" and 
                                                          
42 See AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2000, 26). 
43 See Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). In the international debate the 
transition to PBAs is often seen as a continuum the final point on which is general bud-
get support. See e.g. OECD / DAC (2001); Foster / Leavy (2001). 
44 See EC (2003b, 8 ff.). 
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— an "annual budget" and a "sectoral medium-term expenditure frame-
work." 
— Donor coordination in the sector concerned is managed by the recipi-
ent country. 
Aside from these criteria, many donors see a SWAP as given when a part-
ner country has coordinated its sectoral expenditure framework with its 
overall budget and when the most important donors are involved in the 
program. 
The definitions of macroeconomic and sector budget support are anchored 
in the EC budget-support guidelines adopted in 2002. These guidelines 
summarize the budget-support reforms that have been successively 
adopted since 2002 and approved in several EC and Council documents. 
They regulate the practical formulation of Community budget-support 
programs and provide a concept for budget-support programs that can be 
seen as quite detailed by international comparison. 
2.5 The EC guidelines on provision of budget support: an 
international comparison 
Alongside the UK, the Netherlands, and the World Bank, the European 
Commission is one of the most important donors to have come out in favor 
of budget support. This basic stance is reflected on the one hand in the 
rising share accounted for by program-oriented community financing in 
the overall portfolio of EC DC institutions and on the other by internal 
strategy documents that stipulate a more pronounced program orientation 
and specify the Community's approach. The Commision's strategy docu-
ments and guidelines on the use of budget support are an important point 
of departure in any attempt to determine whether its budget-support pro-
jects are in line with the standards set by other donors. However, we find 
here that only a limited number of institutions define any detailed criteria 
on the concrete implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of budget-
support programs, largely restricting themselves to formulating basic prin-
ciples and objectives of budget support. 
The key document for the planning and transaction of EC budget-support 
projects is the "Guide to the programming and implementation of budget 
support for third countries," which was adopted in March of 2002. Inde-
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pendent budget-support guidelines had become necessary because, first, 
the PRSP approach had altered the frame of reference for the use of budget 
support and, second, it was necessary to bring the instrument into line with 
the recommendations of the Council and the Court of Auditors and to have 
it reflect the innovations that were part of the Cotonou Agreement. And 
third, administrative reform made it necessary to restructure competences 
and responsibilities.45 
The guidelines are based on the experiences already made with budget 
support and – in particular – on the Cotonou Agreement as well as on 
some further strategy documents that declare budget support to be an im-
portant instrument of Community aid. The guidelines are seen as a dy-
namic document, and the intention is to further enlarge and refine them in 
the light of new developments and practical experience. The criteria set 
out in the guidelines are furthermore complemented by a number of con-
tinuative documents, including e.g. documents on performance indicators. 
Compared with the strategy documents of other donors, the EC guidelines 
set out in detail the modalities involved in the financing of budget support 
(see Chapter 4). The guidelines are designed to harmonize working meth-
ods and to strengthen internal partner capacities, and they define a concept 
of budget support which includes, aside from some fundamental reflec-
tions on the subject, all stages of the project cycle from project identifica-
tion to project implementation and evaluation. By comparison, the guide-
lines of most other donors are restricted to the objectives, basic principles, 
and eligibility criteria on the basis of which budget support is provided. 
                                                          
45 The budget-support guidelines were prepared by the Europe Aid Co-operation Office 
(AIDCO) and the Directorates General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and Devel-
opment (DG DEV), which had been created in connection with the administrative re-
form referred to above. AIDCO's task is to provide for an effective and efficient admin-
istration and implementation of projects on the basis of the program planning done by 
the Directorates General. This means that one implementing unit (AIDCO) deals with 
two programming units (DG DEV and DG RELEX) that are responsible for the further 
conceptual development of the EC's set of DC instruments. Although at the program  
level there is no fundamental division between cooperation with the ACP countries on 
the one hand and the rest of the world on the other, DG DEV is the main unit involved 
in the planning of budget support with the ACP countries. See AIDCO / DEV / RELEX 
(2002, 7). 
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The UK 
In its white paper "Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation 
Work for the Poor," the British government stipulates that, presupposing 
the existence of suitable conditions in partner countries, its FC will be 
transacted increasingly via national budgets. In the framework of the dis-
cussion on program-based approaches, DFID sees budget support as an 
especially effective instrument. "Budget support (...), either as support to 
the budget as a whole or as part of a SWAP, is potentially the most effec-
tive financial aid instrument in supporting the PRS core principles." 
DFID's orientation documents on "Poverty Reduction Budget Support" 
and on "Managing Fiduciary Risk when Providing Direct Budget Sup-
port"46 set out the underlying strategic principles of the agency's approach. 
In these documents DFID comes out explicitly for an expansion of budget 
support. The aim of budget support, it is noted, is to support national pov-
erty-reduction strategies and to contribute to reaching the MDGs by in-
creasing poverty-relevant expenditures. In DFID's eyes, an efficient use of 
the instrument must be predicated on the following preconditions: first, a 
strong partner-country commitment to poverty reduction that is monitored 
in a continuous dialogue between donors and partner governments. Sec-
ond, partner governments are expected to commit themselves credibly to 
strengthening and reforming their systems of public budget and financial 
management. In view of the anticipated development impacts, DIFD has 
consciously decided to accept the fiduciary risks associated with the provi-
sion of budget support.47 Budget support is not provided in cases in which 
the fiduciary risks are seen as too high and it appears unlikely that they 
will become smaller during the support process. Third, the use of budget 
support must have clear-cut comparative advantages compared with other 
DC instruments. 
For DFID, the advantages of budget support compared with individual 
projects must be seen in the ability of the former to strengthen ownership 
as well as to contribute to a more intensive dialogue and improved donor 
harmonization. The medium-term expectation is to render aid more acces-
sible to planning (predictability) and to improve social services for poorer 
                                                          
46 DFID (2002); DFID (2004). 
47 "Potential development benefits justify the fiduciary risks." DFID (2004, 4). 
Petra Schmidt 
 German Development Institute 34
population groups. DFID notes that the specific risks involved in budget 
support include above all the eventuality of an abrupt suspension of sup-
port, e.g. for reasons of human rights violations. The agency notes that 
other risks, including fiduciary risks or risks involved in financing prestige 
projects, are not specific to budget support but must be addressed for all 
other DC instruments as well. The DFID guidelines on budget support 
make no concrete statements on program design (terms, tranches, etc.). 
The Netherlands 
Since 1998 Dutch DC has shown an observable trend toward program 
orientation. "The slogan 'Think micro, act macro' tries to capture the belief 
that policies should be based on the needs of the poor but funding should 
be provided at macro level tries to capture the believe that policies should 
be provided at macro level whenever possible and feasible and to fund 
only the meso or micro level whenever necessary."48 The aim is to achieve 
a successive transition from basket funding to budget support. The strate-
gic principles and cornerstones of the Dutch approach are set out in the 
"Memorandum on the relationship between macro-oriented and sectoral 
programme aid."49 The eligibility criteria laid down for the provision of 
general budget support include the implementation of a macroeconomic 
reform program coordinated with the BWIs, good quality of macro-
policies, satisfactory institutional capacities, and a poverty-oriented social 
policy. In view of the fungibility of the funds involved, the memorandum 
calls for monitoring of a partner country's overall system of public finan-
cial management. This, it is further noted, requires a coordinated approach 
on the part of all donors, which should be keyed to existing analytical 
instruments.50 
Apart from the donors mentioned above, the advocates of budget support 
include, among others, CIDA, SIDA, NORAD, DANIDA, ICR, and 
DEZA. As yet, however, these donors have neither set out any comprehen-
sive strategy nor issued implementation documents on their approaches. In 
                                                          
48 Netherlands briefing note, in: http:/Remote4.acdicidac.ca/extranet/policy/swapsboard. 
nsf/SitemapE?Open Agent. 
49 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001). 
50 The memorandum specifically mentions Public Expenditure Reviews (PER), Country 
Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAA), etc. 
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Sweden, for instance, the possibility of granting budget support to partner 
countries is set out in a 1999 set of guidelines on support for partner eco-
nomic reforms.51 The guidelines set the stage for support of partner eco-
nomic reforms, provided that the reforms are geared to economic growth 
as well as to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Moreover, all 
such programs must be coordinated with the BWIs and the donor commu-
nity. The volume of the support provided is geared to progress made on 
PRSs, and support may be given in the form of import aids, balance-of-
payments support, or, increasingly, budget support, although the provision 
of budget support is made conditional on an analysis of public financial 
management. Support is normally granted for one year, although it may, in 
special cases, be extended for several years. The guidelines, which are 
currently under revision, contain no provisions on the monitoring and 
evaluation of budget-support projects. 
Germany 
Program orientation is also an explicit aim of German DC. In addition to 
its DC guidelines, the BMZ has also prepared a position paper and a set of 
guidelines on participation in program aid; these formulate the objectives, 
preconditions, and limits of German participation in joint financing.52 The 
BMZ notes in these documents that program-oriented DC in its various 
forms, from program aid to budget support, contributes better than indi-
vidual projects to improving national frameworks, overcoming ownership 
problems, and providing relief for partner countries. The ministry further 
notes that German DC will for this reason – and wherever it proves rea-
sonable within the framework of its priority strategies – participate in 
program-based joint financing (PGF). 
                                                          
51 "Guidelines for support for economic reforms and debt relief," Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1999). 
52 „Handreichung für die Mitwirkung an gemeinschaftlichen Finanzierungen mit anderen 
Gebern im Rahmen programmorientierter Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.“ [Guidelines 
on participation in joint financing together with other donors in the framework of pro-
gram aid] BMZ (2001a). „Positionspapier für die Mitwirkung an gemeinschaftlichen 
Finanzierungen mit anderen Gebern im Rahmen programmorientierter Entwicklungszu-
sammenarbeit.“ [Position paper on participation in joint financing together with other 
donors in the framework of program aid] BMZ (2001b). 
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Position paper and guidelines were written in 2001 in response to the new 
needs that emerged in connection with program orientation. Until now 
German DC has participated in some 16 PGFs and is preparing a number 
of other projects. Parts of the guidelines and the position paper as well as 
the currently valid TC/FC guidelines are in effect outdated, and they no 
longer adequately reflect the status quo of Germany’s participation in 
PGFs. The TC/FC guidelines are in urgent need of revision to ensure that 
the formal framework is in line with DC practice. The BMZ has prepared a 
draft for new TC/FC guidelines and is presently in the process of coordi-
nating the draft within the ministry. 
For German participation in PGFs, position paper and guidelines stipulate 
that German DC should not cover the entire spectrum of joint financing 
measures. In particular, basket-financing and sector programs could be 
given consideration for German participation, whereas direct general 
budget support should be reduced to cofinancing of Word Bank PRSCs.53 
In practice, budget support is already being approved without any close 
link to a PRSC, as in the cases of Mozambique or Ghana, where German 
DC has joined forces with a group of budget-support donors. 
The following conditions are in place for German participation in program 
aid: First, a joint financing operation must be in accord with the quantita-
tive and qualitative objectives of the German priority strategy paper cover-
ing the area for which joint financing is envisioned. Second, it must be 
ensured that the DC funds provided are used properly. Every possible 
effort should be undertaken to prevent any misappropriation in the sense 
of existing FC criteria. It is noteworthy that the accounting procedures for 
auditing funds provided are expected to meet the customary FC standards 
even before a financing operation gets underway. There is no explicit 
mention of strengthened partner structures as an objective of program-
oriented DC. 
A third precondition is that partner countries are expected to comply with 
the criteria set out in the FC/TC guidelines. The current version of the 
guidelines set relatively narrow limits to any German participation in joint 
                                                          
53 „Insofern ist die direkte Mitfinanzierung des gesamten Haushalts oder eines sektoralen 
Haushalts, bei der die Geberbeiträge in das Haushaltsverfahren des Partners einbezo-
gen sind, nur als Ausnahmefall im Rahmen einer Kofinanzierung von Strukturanpas-
sungsdarlehen mit der Weltbank möglich.“ See BMZ (2001b, 10 Ziffer 3). 
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financing operations. In particular, the guidelines stipulate that partner 
countries are required to bear the current costs of projects that are granted 
support. German cofinancing of current costs is possible only in excep-
tional cases and for a limited period of time. Accordingly, Germany is not 
able to participate in non-earmarked budget-support operations, which are 
used to finance both investments and operational costs. Moreover, the 
TC/FC guidelines stipulate that what is referred to as structural aid be used 
to finance imports. In the past structural aid has been used to cofinance 
World Bank structural adjustment measures. This restriction of German 
contributions to provision of import aids is not practicable in the frame-
work involved in cofinancing PRSCs, which have replaced the structural 
adjustment credits formerly provided by the World Bank. The reason is 
that the disbursement of PRSCs, once tied to imports, is now made de-
pendent on whether or not a partner country meets certain policy condi-
tionalities. For structural aid, the BMZ, with the approval of parliament 
and other ministries, has therefore decided in principle to accept certain 
deviations from the TC/FC guidelines.  
German participation in PRSCs is conditioned on transparent and poverty-
oriented public financial management in partner countries. The BMZ has 
proposed assessing partner public financial management on the basis of 
the standard World Bank and IMF analyses.54 According to the position 
paper, a German contribution can be justified only when a partner's public 
financial management is of satisfactory quality and the macroeconomic 
framework is stable. Two further criteria mentioned as conditions for any 
German cofinancing of PRSCs are unhindered recourse to the law and 
participation of the population in the political process.  
Summary 
It can be said by way of summary that the strategy papers on participation 
in program aid issued by both German DC actors and the bilateral donors 
known to be outright proponents of a program orientation are relatively 
general in their formulation and have little to say about specific financing 
modalities. On the one hand, this may be due, directly or indirectly, to 
efforts to retain the largest possible measure of flexibility. On the other 
hand, though, the amount of background experience presently available 
                                                          
54 It mentions PER and CFAA. 
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would, at least in some cases, appear to be insufficient to derive any dif-
ferentiated criteria. The EC's guidelines extend beyond the conceptual 
positions of other donors, defining rules for reviewing, monitoring, and 
evaluating budget-support projects. As far as the basic principles, eligibil-
ity criteria, and objectives of budget support are concerned, the EC guide-
lines are largely consonant with the strategies of other donors. One thing 
they have in common is their orientation to PRSPs and their call for satis-
factory development of public financial management systems. One factor 
that often plays a key role in coming to financing decisions is the will to 
reform on the part of partner governments and a reform climate that gives 
reason to expect progress in public financial management.  
2.6 The political dimension involved in the provision of 
budget support 
Budget support is conditioned on a satisfactory system of public financial 
management. In the eyes of donors, this is a factor crucial to limiting fidu-
ciary risks. Apart from the risk that support funds may not be used – effi-
ciently – for the purposes intended, there is also a risk that donor funds 
may be misappropriated. One of the main reasons for this risk is a lack of 
sound governance. The question in the context is whether and to what 
extent good governance is generally the subject of EC budget-support 
reviews. Since good governance is often seen in relation to civil and po-
litical human rights and democratic principles, it must furthermore be 
considered whether these aspects are accorded due heed in the EC's budget 
support. One possibility here would be to include political conditionalities 
in the EC's financing proposals. 
In the broadest sense of the term, political conditionality may be under-
stood as a development-policy concept under which donors condition the 
volume and the use of various DC instruments on the political framework 
conditions given in partner countries. However, there is some controversy 
as to what political framework conditions should be seen as ideal for sus-
tainable development, a fact which goes to explain the in part substantial 
differences between concepts of political conditionality. The most frequent 
criteria and objectives of political conditionality include respect for human 
rights and democratic principles as well as sound and responsible govern-
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ance.55 Most donor countries condition their development cooperation on 
compliance with these criteria. One important exception here is the World 
Bank, whose statutes prohibit it, as a multilateral organization, from taking 
an active political stance and intervening in the political affairs of its 
member countries. The one condition it sets for cooperation is good gov-
ernance, which, while including the rule of law, extends neither to demo- 
cratic principles nor to political or civil human rights. 
ACP-EC relations were also long shaped by political neutrality. Even 
though the EC's DC has shown clear signs of a practical human rights 
orientation since the mid-1970s, the Lomé I to II agreements contain no 
specific articles on human rights or democratization. Only since Lomé IV 
have human rights clauses been included in the EU's partnership agree-
ments. However, they do not provide for any sanctions for human rights 
violations. This situation changed with the Cotonou Agreement, which 
contains provisions designed to substantially strengthen the political di-
mension. The key provisions are contained in Article 9 and in Articles 96 
and 97. Article 9 §2 defines respect for human rights, democratic princi-
ples, and the rule of law as "essential elements" of the agreement. Viola-
tions are covered by Article 96, which provides for the initiation of a con-
sultation procedure. The aim of these consultations is to thoroughly exam-
ine the situation and to coordinate measures to remedy it. Consultations 
are to last no more than 60 days. If no solution is found, "appropriate 
measures" may be taken that are in accordance with international law, and 
proportional to the violation. The article provides for suspension of coop-
eration as a means of last resort. In cases of special urgency the article 
provides for the possibility of an accelerated unilateral procedure. Article 
9 defines good governance as a "fundamental element" of the agreement, 
and is thus not covered by Article 96. Article 97, however, likewise pro-
vides for the possibility of initiating consultations in serious cases of cor-
ruption and authorizes the parties to take appropriate measures. 
The greater significance accorded to the political dimension in Articles 96 
and 97 of the Cotonou Agreement is linked with a larger measure of po-
litical conditionality, a fact which critics see as running counter to the 
                                                          
55 See Stokke (1995, 21 ff.); the OECD's Development Cooperation Directorate (DAC) 
also adds "participatory development" as an important criterion for political framework 
conditions. See Hammel (1997, 22). 
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underlying idea of partnership.56 A genuine partnership, they argue, would 
have to be based on a balanced and open political dialogue that is not 
regimented by conditionalities. Unconditioned dialogue is also a priority 
concern of the ACP countries, which reject, above all, any unilateral sus-
pension of cooperation.57 To accommodate the demands of the ACP coun-
tries, Article 8 of the agreement provides for an intensive and balanced 
political dialogue designed to regularly assess the situation as regards the 
"essential elements" of the agreement. 
Dialogue with partner governments is an important element of cooperation 
in budget-support operations. Willingness to support and cofinance part-
ner-formulated reform programs presupposes a continuous exchange of 
information on progress and, if need be, adjustments to a reform agenda. 
Most budget-support programs provide for policy dialogue as a general 
condition of financing. What is meant here, however, is not the political 
dialogue referred to in Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. As a rule, 
political aspects are not discussed: "For the EDF the position is relatively 
clear: the forum for political issues is the political dialogue defined under 
Cotonou. This may cover any instrument of cooperation, including budget 
support. It may well be that budget support should be one of the first in-
struments to be deployed, but that choice should be made in the context of 
the political dialogue."58 The policy dialogue conducted in the framework 
of budget support focuses on economic questions relevant to reaching the 
goals of macroeconomic reform and reducing poverty. One important 
aspect of this dialogue is transparent and accountable administration of the 
funds provided, which is seen as an element of good governance. Accord-
ingly, the so-called essential elements – human rights, democratic princi-
ples, and the rule of law – are not explicitly set as conditions for budget 
support, whereas the fundamental element of good governance is defined 
as a condition. A violation of the essential elements may affect budget-
support operations only if measures are taken in the framework of a con-
sultation procedure that lead to termination or suspension of support.  
Apart from the inclusion of political conditionality as a general condition 
of a financing agreement, it is also possible to set political conditionalities 
                                                          
56 See Molt (2002, 65). 
57 See Bossuyt et al. (1999, 9). 
58 See EC (2004a, 12). 
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for the choice of the indicators used for disbursement of the variable 
tranche. In keeping with the guidelines on budget support, these indicators 
are keyed to the PRSP submitted by a given country. If at all possible, 
these indicators are expected to be in conformity with the PRSP indicators. 
The PRSPs of numerous countries set out the goals of strengthening de-
mocratic principles and improving general political conditions.59 Still, EC 
budget-support projects do not as a rule include indicators that reflect the 
political perspective of these PRSPs. One innovation that can be used to 
reconstruct the discussion on political indicators for the variable tranche is 
the financing proposal on budget support for Ethiopia (PRBS II). On the 
insistence of several member states, the first version of the financing pro-
posal contained indicators on elections and democratization. The intention 
was to condition the disbursement of € 2 million of the overall volume of 
€ 95 million on compliance with these so-called governance indicators. 
However, during the 377th session of the European Development Fund 
(EDF), which deliberated on the proposal, the EC was unable to present a 
final goal matrix for these indicators. Agreement had not yet been reached 
with the Ethiopian government on governance indicators. Several member 
states then made a case for waiting for the final version of the indicator 
matrix and postponing the adoption of PRBS II to a later session. The EC 
rejected this view and came out in favor of an immediate adoption in the 
EDF Committee. It at the same time assured that it was willing to work in 
favor of the political criteria, which were something entirely new for 
Ethiopia, and not to sign the financing accord before agreement had been 
reached with the Ethiopian government. The outcome was that the financ-
ing proposal was adopted unanimously in the same session, even though 
the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands took a critical view of the compro-
mise proposal tabled by the EC.60  
Negotiations with the Ethiopian government continued after the proposal 
had been adopted by the EDF. At the same time, the EC abruptly found 
itself in the midst of a fundamental discussion on political indicators for 
the variable tranche. Critics noted that responding to violations of impor-
tant elements of the Cotonou Agreement by effecting relatively small 
reductions in the volume of funds provided was the wrong approach - the 
                                                          
59 See e.g. the PRSPs submitted by Madagascar, Mali, Ethiopia: RoMad (2003, 63 f.), 
RoMal (2002, 47), FRoE (2002, 48 ff.). 
60 See BMZ (2003, 2). 
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reason being that the size of the variable tranche is assessed on the basis of 
a set of indicators covering various priority areas of PRSPs. And since, for 
the most part, all indicators are weighted equally, the influence of one 
indicator on the volume of a disbursement is quite limited. It was further-
more noted that since respect for democratic principles, human rights, or 
the rule of law are of paramount importance, these aspects could not be 
covered in an individual financing agreement and should instead be re-
garded as a basic principle of cooperation as per Article 9 of the Cotonou 
Agreement. This view prevailed in the EC, and the governance indicators 
were removed from PRBS II. The final financing agreement, which was 
signed seven months after it had been adopted by the EDF, contains indi-
cators on health, education, private-sector development, infrastructure, 
food security, and the quality of public financial management. Unlike the 
essential elements not given the form of indicators, nearly all the variable-
tranche indicators make reference to the quality of public financial man-
agement . This gives the fundamental element of the Cotonou Agreement a 
weight that extends beyond the general policy dialogue provided for. In 
other words, poor performance on public financial management is sanc-
tioned in the framework of an individual project without casting doubt on 
the project as a whole. Only in especially serious cases of corruption does 
Article 97 apply, a situation which makes it possible to suspend all budget 
support.  
3 Financial and budgetary scope 
3.1 Volumes and trends, 2000–2005 
The trend toward program orientation in the EC's DC can be illustrated on 
the basis of rising figures for budget-support commitments and disburse-
ments (Fig. 4). Between 2000 and 2004 budget-support more than dou-
bled, from € 348.23 million in 2000 to € 772.8 million in 2003, and a simi-
larly high level was anticipated for 2004. Moreover, the EC has affirmed 
its determination to increase, or at least to hold constant, the volume of 
commitments until the end of 2007.61 A substantial increase in disburse-
ments was anticipated for 2004. While a total of € 406.2 million in budget 
                                                          
61 The 9th EDF is set to expire in 2007. See EC (2004a, 4). 
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support was disbursed to ACP countries in 2003, a volume of € 830 mil-
lion was expected for 2004 (see Annexes 3 and 5).62 
The sharp rise in approvals in 2003 and disbursements in 2004 is due to 
the fact that the 9th EDF was delayed in coming into effect. The EDF is the 
Community's most important aid instrument for its cooperation with the 
ACP countries. Each EDF is set up for a period of roughly five years and 
is geared to the terms of a partnership agreement. The 9th EDF, which was 
set up when the Cotonou Agreement was signed, is endowed with € 13.5 
billion for a period of five years.63 These funds have, however, only been 
available since the agreement entered into force on April 1, 2003. In an-
                                                          
62 The data are based on the final agreements with the ACP countries; see EC (2004a), 
Annex 1. The EDF funds are approved in a two-stage procedure involving the EC and 
the ACP countries concerned. Once its has received a positive opinion from the EDF 
Committee, the EC, the agency responsible, comes to a decision on financing. Then, in 
the framework of a financing agreement, it defines the conditions under which its deci-
sion is implemented by the responsible national agency in the country concerned. This 
may involve slight adjustments in the volumes of the funds approved by the EDF. 
Furthermore, some financing proposals are signed by the EC only in the calendar year 
following EDF approval. This explains some discrepancies between the volume of bud-
get support approved per year by the EDF and the data published by the EC (see. Anne-
xes 3 and 4, below). 
63 See EC (2000c, 2). 
Figure 4: Budget-support approvals and disbursements 1999–2004,  
 forecast for 2005 
 
Source: Own presentation, based on von EC (2004b, Annex 1) 
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ticipation of ratification, a number of comprehensive budget-support pro-
grams were planned and prepared for; they were approved as soon as the 
funds were released, a fact which goes to explain the high level of fund 
commitments in 2003.64 The EC envisions expanding budget support over 
the medium term. Still, the commitments and disbursements forecast for 
2005 show a declining trend. The reason for this is that, with a view to 
launching larger projects, the EC plans to await the results of the mid-term 
reviews of country programs that were planned for 2004 and that could be 
used to modify the way resources are allocated.  
At present a total of roughly € 1.5 billion has been committed as budget 
support. In 33 ACP countries budget-support programs are either already 
in operation or planned for the near future. Disbursement of the funds is 
conditioned on beneficiary compliance with the terms agreed upon. Sub-
stantial sums were, for instance, transferred to Benin and Mozambique in 
2001. In 2001 Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Tanzania received sizable pay-
ments in the framework of budget-support programs. On the other hand, 
payments were suspended for countries for which the EC noted delays in 
economic reforms, insufficient government commitment to poverty reduc-
tion, or major weakness in public financial management (Senegal, Malawi, 
Gabon, Central African Republic).65 
Many recipients of budget support are among the countries that are seen as 
"good performers," e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, or Burkina Faso. Even so, 
the EC does not rule out budget support for countries that have a less posi-
tive performance record or are in the process of recovery from a post-
conflict situation. The only key eligibility criterion is compliance with the 
conditions set out in the Cotonou Agreement.66 Thus far 33 of 77 ACP 
countries have met the criteria and are receiving budget support. 
Apart from general budget support, the EC also provides sector budget 
support for sector programs. It furthermore participates in basket financing 
                                                          
64 To ensure that parts of the Cotonou Agreement could be implemented before the 
agreement took effect, the EC had, in 2002, begun taking steps to commit funds from 
the 8th EDF with a view to the programming projected for 9th EDF. This enabled the EC 
to commit a total of € 732,9 million in budget-support funds from the reserves of the 8th 
EDF, which amounted to € 1.2 billion. See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2003, 334). 
65 See ibid. (2003, 10). 
66 See EC (2004a, 4). 
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or provides project-related contributions in support of sector programs. 
According to provisional data from AIDCO, the present total volume of 
support provided to sector-specific programs in the education sector is € 
117.35 million.67 In the health sector the EC is currently providing € 104.0 
million in support for relevant programs. There are, in addition, two bas-
ket-financing projects in the preparation phase. In all, 22.5 % of this sup-
port is provided in the form of sectoral budget aids, while 38.37 % is pro-
vided in the form of basket financing, and 26.64 % consists of contribu-
tions to projects.68  
3.2 Budget support and the slow implementation of the EDF 
In connection with the debate on greater efficiency and quality of Europe's 
external aid, many observers have pointed critically to the slow progress 
made in implementing the EDF, a state of affairs that is reflected in low 
commitments of funds on the one hand and slow outflows of funds on the 
other.69 Since November 2002 at the latest, when Commissioner Nielsen 
publicly expressed his concern over a total of € 11 billion in unutilized 
EDF resources,70 more attention has been paid – not least by the EC – to 
the rhythm in which the EDF is implemented. Various measures have been 
taken to accelerate the outflow of funds; they include more use of quick-
disbursing instruments, i.e. budget support and nonprogrammable aids. 
This could contribute crucially to ensuring that the 8th and 9th EDFs do not 
take so extremely long to implement as their predecessors. 
In its annual budget reports the European Court of Auditors has repeatedly 
pointed to the protracted periods time it has taken to implement the EDF.71 
Table 1 shows the implementation of the 6th, 7th, and 8th EDF on December 
                                                          
67 See EC (2004b, Annex 2). 
68 For one program (volume: € 10.2 million) no information is provided on financing 
modalities. 
69 See Mackie / Frederiksen / Rossini (2004, 5). 
70 See Commissioner Nielsen's opening address at the African-European Ministerial 
Meeting in Ouagadougou on 28 November 2002. In January and April 2003, in a speech 
held before the Parliamentary Assembly and the Development Committee, Commission- 
er Nielson criticized the slow implementation of the EDF. See http://europa. 
eu.int/comm/commissioners/nielson/speeches/speeches/_en.htm (20 March 2005). 
71 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2000), (2001b). 
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31, 2000, 2001, and 2002. In the financial year 2000 the three EDFs in the 
course of implementation entered their fifteenth, tenth, and third years of 
implementation, respectively. At the end of 2000 39.0 % of the resources 
of the 8th EDF, 98 % of the 7th EDF, and 99 % of the 6th EDF had been 
committed. Taken together, € 6.2 billion of the overall fund volume of 
€ 31.3 billion were still available for new approvals. This sum was reduced 
to € 4.6 billion in the course of 2001. At the end of 2002 the resources 
available for new commitments still amounted to € 2.9 billion. In other 
words, the balance of funds available for new approvals amounted to 9 % 
of the fund's overall resources, as opposed to figures of 14 % for the end 
of 2001 and 19 % for the end of 2000. 
The slow rhythm of EDF implementation is also visible at the level of 
disbursements. On December 31, 2000, the volume of committed funds 
yet to be disbursed was just under € 9.0. Most of these funds were commit-
ted for pluriannual projects that, depending on the course of program im-
plementation, have either not yet got underway or are being transacted in 
tranches.72 Even though such relatively high levels of committed but un-
disbursed funds are, accordingly, not unusual, disbursements have re-
mained behind the targets. If we compare e.g. the implementation of the 
budget in 2001 with the cash resource requirements estimated by the EC at 
the end of 2002, we find that disbursements accounted for only 80 % of 
the volume estimated. The year 2002 saw a further slowdown in the out-
flow of funds, a fact due in part to persistent unrest in a number of ACP 
countries. At the end of 2002 the volume of funds that had been appropri-
ated but not disbursed amounted to € 8.4 billion – as opposed to disburse-
ments amounting to € 1.9 billion. 
The EC distinguishes between normal, as yet undisbursed funds that are 
committed to pluriannual projects or reflect new commitments that have 
not yet been disbursed and problematic funds that have been committed 
but not disbursed. Commitments are termed problematic if no funds have 
been disbursed for a project within two years time or a period of five years 
has elapsed since the funds were appropriated. 14.4 % of the € 8.4 billion 
in funds not disbursed as of December 31, 2002, was attributed to prob-
                                                          
72 According to EC information, the levels of committed funds that have not been disbur-
sed are in line with the average for EU member states or even lower in proportional 
terms. See KOM (2003a, 6). 
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lematic commitments. These funds, often referred to as "dormant com-
mitments," are very difficult to utilize for a project other than the one for 
which they were originally approved.73 
In other words, at the close of 2002 a total of € 11.3 billion from the EDFs 
had not been utilized; roughly three quarters of this sum was accounted for 
by appropriated funds that had not yet been disbursed, and one quarter was 
available for new commitments. The funds that were still available were 
transferred to the 9th EDF when the Cotonou Agreement entered into force 
on April 1, 2003. Since then is has not been possible to commit any further 
funds from the 6th, 7th, and 8th EDFs.74 In the 2003 financial year the EC 
undertook new commitments amounting to € 3.7 million and disbursed a 
total of € 2.2 million.75 At the end of 2003 the balance of uncommitted 
funds from the 9th EDF (including the residual funds from the 6th, 7th, and 
8th EDFs) was € 11.9 billion. On the other hand, € 9.7 billion had already 
been approved but not yet disbursed.76 
 
                                                          
73 See KOM (2003a), p. 6. Unlike the EC's definition, the European Court of Auditors 
refers to commitments as "dormant" if no disbursements have been made during the 
previous 18 months. See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2003, 332). 
74 Until the Cotonou Agreement was ratified, the 6th, 7th, and 8th EDFs were implement-
ed in parallel. While it is true that in principle these funds also have a five-year term, 
there are no time limits on their use until the EC determines that each fund has in effect 
been implemented and transfers the residual resources to a later fund. See Europäischer 
Rechnungshof (2000, 208). 
75 See KOM (2004, 10). 
76 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2004, 439). 
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The slow implementation of the EDFs is due in part to political reasons, 
including reduction or even suspension of aid because of unrest in partner 
countries (Togo, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Mada-
gascar, Kenya, etc.). On the other hand, there are also structural reasons, 
e.g. lack of capacity of partner administrations to absorb funds, a state of 
affairs that continues, despite the assistance provided through the EDF as 
well as by other donors. Two other reasons must be sought in the Commis-
sion's administration of aid, which – despite definition of priority areas – is 
Table 1: Implementation of the 6th, 7th und 8th EDFs, 2000–2003  
 (in € million) 
 
Volume commited but 
not yet disbursed 
Appropriated funds 
As of the end of 2000   
6th EDF  360.0   333.0 
7th EDF 2255.1   854.0 
8th EDF 6367.8 4960.7 
Total volume 8982.9 6147.3 
Implementation rate           27.40 %           18.80 % 
As of the end of 2001   
6th EDF   295.3   347.2 
7th EDF 1896.4   700.6 
8th EDF 6277.5 3596.7 
Total volume 8469.2 4644.5 
Implementation rate           25.80 %           14.20 % 
As of the end of 2002   
6th EDF   249.6   344.4 
7th EDF 1696.3   583.0 
8th EDF 6438.9 1991.8 
Total volume 8384.8 2919.2 
Implementation rate           25.50 %             8.90 % 
Source: Own presentation, based on data from the European Court of Auditors 
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marked by high levels of dispersion, as well as by cumbersome implemen-
tation procedures (contracts, payments) and inadequate project prepara-
tion.77 
In the financial year 2000, in connection with its reform of external assis-
tance, the EC took the following measures to accelerate the outflow of 
funds and the effectiveness of the EDFs: 
— A gradual transition to budget support. 
— Improvement of the quality of project preparation based on a new 
concepts of resource allocation (sliding programming) which makes it 
possible to modify the way resources are allocated, e.g. on the basis 
of performance aspects. 
— Mid-term and final reviews of country-specific cooperation strategies. 
— Use of deconcentration to raise the efficiency of administrative pro- 
cesses. 
— Use of public contracts to simplify award procedures. 
— Institutional capacity-building in the ACP countries. 
Except for the quick-disbursing instruments, however, the effects the 
measures have on the EDF are likely to materialize only over the medium 
term.78 On the other hand, the EC, making more intensive use of the in-
strument of macroeconomic budget support, has been able to effect tangi-
ble increases in both commitments and disbursements. This instrument 
accounted for 23 % of the decisions made in 2002, as compared with fig-
ures of 14 % in 2001 and 12 % in 2000.79 At the end of 2002 the dis-
                                                          
77 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2001b, 425). 
78 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2003, 336). 
79 In its 2003 report on the EDF the European Court of Auditors calls on the EC to supply 
some missing data on the state of implementation of direct budget support. This budget 
support could not be assessed on the basis of the EDF accounts because the data stem-
med from different financing instruments. This also explains the disparities between the 
data provided by the EC and the report prepared by Court of Auditors, which e.g. esti-
mates the volume of the decisions on budget support taken in 2002 at € 404.3 million, 
whereas the EC indicates a figure of € 535.6 million (see. Annex 4). The Court of Audi-
tors recommends that measures be taken to ensure that in the future information on fi-
nancing modalities contain precise data on the volume of the support provided. See Eu-
ropäischer Rechnungshof (2003, 335 and 339). 
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bursements made in the form of budget support accounted for 20 % of 
overall disbursements, as compared with a figure of 15 % in 2001. As the 
EC affirms, the 2003 financial year experienced the best EDF results for 
commitments and disbursements since the start of the cooperation agree-
ments with the ACP countries. One important factor involved here was 
budget support, which accounted for a volume of approvals amounting to 
€ 807.6 million.80 
There is no doubt that the gradual transition to budget support has had 
positive effects on the implementation rhythm of the EDFs. Budget sup-
port is used explicitly as a quick-disbursing instrument and, compared 
with the system of project financing used until now, it also contributes to 
speeding up the outflow of funds. Even so, budget support should not be 
misunderstood as a mere vehicle for accelerating outflows. Budget support 
is instead an important component of the EC's new development-policy 
strategy, one that reflects efforts to boost the effectiveness of DC. 
The EC's Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) clearly indicate whether budget 
support is tied into a comprehensive country-level program or provided ad 
hoc to countries for which commitments and disbursements have not met 
expectations. The CSPs, which the Council has ordered to be prepared for 
all ACP countries, set out a working program for three to five years. They 
define fields of cooperation, formulate measures required to meet the ob-
jectives set out, and provide some initial indications on resource alloca-
tion. The CSPs contain on average 21.4 % of the programmable funds 
earmarked for budget support. Other important cooperation sectors include 
transportation (30.7 %), health and education (10.7 %), and rural devel-
opment (8 %).81 
Comparison of the budget-support funds programmed and appropriated by 
the end of 2003 shows that the relevant Country Strategy Papers provided 
for budget aids in nearly all countries for which the EDF had approved 
budget support. The only exception is the Cape Verde LSP, which con-
                                                          
80 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2004, 439). 
81 In essence, the financial resources of the 9th EDF are earmarked for programmable A-
envelope aids (macroeconomic budget support, sector programs, and development-
assistance projects) and nonprogrammable B-envelope aids (emergency aid, aid for debt 
reduction and mitigation of export slumps). The figures cited refer to 61 of 76 CSPs that 
were evaluated in March 2002. See EC (2002). 
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tains no reference to the budget support that was later approved. However, 
there are some major disparities as regards the funding volumes pro-
grammed and approved for budget support (Fig. 5). Since most CSPs are 
valid until 2007, however, it is not possible to make any final assessments 
on the congruence between planning and implementation. Furthermore, 
under sliding programming it is possible to modify CSPs. Based on the 
mid-term reviews conducted in 2004 for all ACP countries, it is possible to 
modify allocations both within a country program and between ACP coun-
tries.82 Not only needs criteria but also criteria designed to measure part-
ner-government performance are used for purposes of review.83 These 
performance criteria refer on the one hand to the recipient country's im-
plementation of national benchmark programs and on the other hand to 
progress made in priority sectors as well as on macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. In this system appropriations in excess of an originally programmed 
  
                                                          
82 See EC (2003a, 3). 
83 See DG DEV (2000), p. 9. Resource allocation under sliding programming is referred to 
in the secondary literature as a "performance-based allocation system" or as "perfor-
mance-based partnership." See e.g. Santiso (2002, 120). 
Figure 5: Disparity between EC-approved budget support and allocations 
 for the NIP 
 
Source: Own presentation 
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sum tend more to indicate good recipient performance than problems in-
volved in program transaction. At the end of 2003 the sums earmarked for 
budget support in Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia had been approved in 
full. To avoid any interruption in the budget support to these countries, 
which are able to absorb the funds, additional budget aids were included in 
planning, within the framework of the country-specific mid-term re-
views.84 
As a means of ensuring that a more rapid implementation of the EDFs 
based on increasing budget support does not adversely affect the quality of 
the EU's external aid, the EC is required to determine that the eligibility 
criteria for support are met in the partner countries and to review them on 
a continuous basis in the course of sliding programming. All initiatives in 
favor of more budget support are predicated on satisfactory quality of 
public financial management and control procedures in the ACP countries 
concerned. The EC is responsible for strictly monitoring the fulfillment of 
all target criteria. The reason why this is so important is that the proce-
dures involved in the separate EDF administration for budget support have 
been suspended in favor of national procedures in the ACP countries. The 
following section will look into the measures the EC takes to review na-
tional procedures and the way in which the EC concretely formulates 
budget support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84 For Mozambique the MTR recommends an increase in the A-envelope (from which 
budget support is financed) of € 205.25 million. Increases of € 80 and € 55.2 million are 
recommended for Zambia and Tanzania, respectively. 
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4 Program conception and implementation: central 
characteristics of the EC's budget-support programs 
The budget-support guidelines adopted in March 2002 set out the central 
elements of EC budget-support operations. The guidelines sum up the 
budget-support reforms that have been embarked upon successively since 
2000; they have since been adopted by the EC and the Council in several 
reference documents. The aim of the following sections is to work out 
some of the central characteristics of the budget-support concept and to 
examine whether and to what extent they have been used in preparing the 
financing proposals for budget support. 
Between January 2000 and December 2003 the EDF Committee adopted 
50 financing proposals for macroeconomic budget support. The proposed 
programs are mainly concerned with budget aid designed to support part-
ner countries in conducting macroeconomic reforms (47). Due to short-
term problems in the beneficiary countries concerned, three financing 
proposals were prepared and disbursed as emergency aid. The present 
study evaluates all financing proposals that were adopted in the period in 
question and exceed a volume of € 15 million.85 These are 30 programs for 
18 countries (Table 2), for which a total of € 1.7 billion was approved. The 
program with the largest approved volume – € 168 million – was for Mo-
zambique (PRBS II). 
                                                          
85 The PARPAS V (Niger) and PABS 4 (Uganda) programs could not be evaluated for 
lack of documentation. 
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Table 2: Programs examined in connection with the present study 
EDF 
meeting 
Recipient 
country 
Program titel Volume  
appropriated 
(in € million) 
358 Benin Programme d’appui aux réformes 
économiques PARE 2001 
18.8 
379  Appui budgétaire conjoint pour la 
réduction de la pauvreté (2003 – 2005) 
55.0 
358 Burkina 
Faso 
Appui budgétaire pour la réduction de la 
pauvreté ABRP 
23.5 
370  Appui budgétaire pour la réduction de la 
pauvreté 
125.0 
373 Burundi ADARE 2003 Programme Allegement de 
la Dette et Appui aux Reformes 
Economiques 
22.6 
358 Cameroon Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support 19.51 
358 CAR Structural Adjustment Support 
Programme 2001/2001 
22.0 
358 Chad PRBS 01-02 37.1 
378  Programme d’appui budgétaire pour la 
réduction de la pauvreté et la croissance 
50.0 
364 Ethiopia SAS II BIS Structural Adjustment 
Support 
25.7 
368  Poverty Reduction Budget Support PRBS 
I 
44.0 
377  Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support PRBS 
II 
95.0 
365 Ghana Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support 
PRBS 2001 
37.8 
354 Guinea 
Bissau 
Programa de Apoio às Reformas 
Economicas (PARE I) 
17.2 
360 Jamaica Support to Economic Reform Programme 
II (SERP II) 
21.7 
373  Support to Economic Reform Programme 
III (SERP III) 
30.0 
356 Kenya Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support 
PRBS 1 
35.0 
359 Lesotho Poverty Reduction Budgetary Support 
Programme (PRBSP) 2001/2002 
18.5 
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To date, more than one budget-support program based on the new budget-
support concept has been adopted only for a limited number of ACP coun-
tries. However, it will be a number of years before a final, guideline-
oriented evaluation of the programs can be conducted. The same applies 
for the anticipated effects – for instance, as regards increased partner own-
ership, strengthening of public financial management systems, etc. Some 
first experiences with program implementation are included in the study in 
the form of two country examples (Ethiopia, Mozambique). 
Continued Table 2 
EDF-
meeting 
Recipient 
country 
Program titel Volume  
appropriated 
(in € million) 
365 Mali Programme d’appui budgétaire au cadre 
stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté 
25.8 
379  Programme pluriannuel d’appui budgétaire au 
cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté 
132.9 
359 Mauritania Programme d’appui budgétaire à la réduction 
de la pauvreté PAS IV 
  18.3 
358 Mozambique Poverty Reduction Budget Support I (PRBS 
I) 
  65.7 
372  Poverty Reduction Budget Support II (PRBS 
II) 2002–2005 
168.0 
376 Niger Programme pluriannuel d’appui à la  
réduction de la Pauvreté (PPARP)  
2003–2005 
  90.0 
358 Rwanda Structural Adjustment Support Programme 
SAP II 
  59.6 
378  Programme pluriannuel d’appui à la réduction 
de la Pauvreté 2003–2005 (PPARP)  
  50.0 
360 Tanzania Poverty Reduction Budget Support for FY 
01/02 (PRBS 01) 
  76.1 
376  Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
Programme 2003–2006 (PRBS 02) 
114.0 
353 Zambia Structural Adjustment and SYSMIN Support 
Programme (SAF V / SYSMIN) 
109.6 
379  Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
Programme 2004–2006 (PRBS 01) 
117.0 
Quelle: Own presentation 
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4.1 Financing modalities and design of EC budget-support 
programs 
4.1.1 Direct, untargeted budget support: genesis, 
justification, and risks 
Viewed in historical terms, the budget support provided by the EC is 
linked with the concept of "counterpart funds." Counterpart funds are 
revenues that accrue, in the course of financial cooperation, in the cur-
rency of a recipient country, e.g. from sales to nationals of imports or 
import licenses. The 7th EDF provided support for structural adjustment in 
partner countries in the form of general import programs or sectoral import 
programs. The funds for these programs, which were disbursed in foreign 
exchange, gave rise to counterpart funds that were used to finance budget-
ary expenditures. The uses to which these foreign-exchange funds were 
put were required to be documented on the basis of import papers. How-
ever, importers paid their invoices in domestic currency, and this was 
handled by setting up counterpart funds in domestic currency.86 The provi-
sion of funds that are transferred to a foreign-exchange account before 
they flow into the national budget is referred to as indirect budget support 
(Fig. 6). 
The revision of Lomé IV undertaken in Mauritius created the possibility of 
providing direct budget support to countries with fully convertible and 
transferable currencies.87 With this type of aid, recipient countries are no 
longer required to present import documents for the foreign exchange they 
receive. The funds are directly integrated into their national budgets and 
then channeled on. 
The transition from indirect to direct budget support was effected in con-
formity with the recommendations of IMF and World Bank, and the con-
sequence was that a major share of the structural adjustment aids provided 
from the 8th EDF were allocated in the form of direct budget support. The 
                                                          
86 The funds provided from the EDF are first transferred in Euros to an account set up for 
the purpose in a partner country, usually with the central bank. Then the equivalent va-
lue of these funds is transferred in domestic currency to an account opened with the  
same bank. 
87 See Article 224 of the revised version of Lomé IV. 
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intention here was to use the additional budget resources in particular to 
support prioritized social sectors such as health and education. This 
seemed called for because structural adjustment programs as a rule require 
the countries concerned to restructure their public expenditures in ways 
that adversely affect the social services on which poorer population groups 
rely.88 
 
                                                          
88 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2001a, 5). 
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To ensure that these budget resources are used to the benefit of the social 
sectors, the EC stipulated that expenditures be purpose-tied. 35 % of the 
structural adjustment aids provided between 1991 and 1998 were targeted 
to the health sector, 30 % to the education sector. Other sectors accorded a 
certain priority included transportation (road maintenance) (8 %), adminis-
trative decentralization (3 %), and rural development (3 %). Current ex-
penditures (61 %) were accorded priority over spending for investment 
(29 %) or debt reduction (10 %).89 
In many partner countries EC budget support has been used to cover all 
current costs for the health and education sectors (without wages and sala-
ries), and this has generally led to satisfactory levels of budget implemen-
tation. Without support the levels of budget implementation would have 
been very low, as it was e.g. in Malawi, where the EC covered 98 % of the 
health ministry's administrative expenditures.90  
Still, there are reasons to question the efficiency of targeting. For one 
thing, in selecting funds to be targeted the focus has not always been on 
the intended impacts in the social sectors. In some cases budget support 
served primarily to speed up the provision of resources for the budgets 
concerned, while in other cases the main concern was to ensure that the 
subsequent administrative and accounting efforts required to document the 
use to which the funds were put would not prove too difficult. Control of 
the use of these funds was in some cases restricted to a requirement to later 
provide a formal documentation of expenditures, but one that did not trace 
a direct link between these expenditures and the delivery of social services 
to poorer population groups.91 For another, targeting was frequently bound 
up with cumbersome internal EC administrative procedures, a fact which 
proved to have more or less marked counterproductive effects on budget 
implementation. There were, for instance, cases in which expenditures 
were delayed because the required control modalities were too protracted 
or because of misunderstandings regarding the logic of budget support. 
                                                          
89 These averaged values refer to 96 % of the sums financed from the 7th EDF between 
1991 and 1997 as well as for 23 programs for which resources were provided in 1998 
from the 8th EDF. See KOM (2000b, 10). 
90 See Groupement 2AC Associés Audit et Conseil - Transtec - Deloitte & Touche Spain 
(2000, 22). 
91 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2001a, 257). 
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Despite these technical deficits, the concept of targeting came in for criti-
cism for not focusing on the overall situation involved in public financial 
management. However, because all public budget funds are fungible, the 
only way to audit whether the support provided has been used properly is 
in the framework of the overall budget. Furthermore, the choice and fi-
nancing of individual eligible expenditures has no sustainable effects on 
the quality of public financial management in the countries concerned. For 
the structural adjustment loans it has provided since 1996, the World Bank 
has focused more on monitoring general budget implementation than on 
controlling the exact uses to which the funds provided have been put. 
Although the EC has been providing comprehensive budget support since 
the 7th EDF, it was only in 1998 that it started to conduct holistic evalua-
tions of the budget systems of the ACP countries. In subsequent years, 
however, audits continued to be limited to monitoring expenditures 
equivalent to the amount of Community support provided. 
Starting in 2000, the EC gradually abandoned its practice of targeting 
expenditures in favor of a less detailed allocation of resources for coun-
tries with satisfactory public financial management systems.92 Since then 
the funds have been transferred to a recipient-country account that does 
not need to be countersigned by the EC.93 Targeting continues only for 
countries that have substantial difficulties in implementing their budget 
and administering public finances. 23 of the budget-support programs 
looked into here provide for a untargeted provision of funds. 29 programs 
directly channel the support provided to the recipient country's budget 
(Fig. 7). 
The transition to direct and untargeted budget support requires partner 
governments to participate in a dialogue on important strategic issues of 
poverty reduction. Since the funds provided are channeled into the overall 
budget, the donor has a legitimate claim to monitor, and if need be to in-
fluence, the recipient's poverty-oriented budget planning and implementa-
tion. Many financing proposals point to the importance of a policy dia-
logue covering both government expenditure priorities and the measures 
                                                          
92 See KOM (2000b, 22). 
93 Targeted funds are transferred to a dual-authorization account set up by the recipient 
country, usually with the central bank. Account transactions require dual authorization 
by the EC representative and the authorized national representative. 
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and procedures required for implementation. Over half of these programs 
explicitly stipulate a satisfactory policy dialogue with the recipient gov-
ernment as a condition for program implementation. 
First experiences clearly indicate that untargeted budget support tends to 
promote policy dialogue between the EC and recipient governments. 
Ethiopia is one example of a gradual upgrading of policy dialogue in con-
nection with the provision of budget support. Here, the first two assess-
ment missions of a group of donors (see Box 1), which included the EC, 
found a situation marked by slow-moving negotiations and a lack of will-
ingness on the part of the government to engage in dialogue. It was during 
the last mission, in September 2004, that this reticence was overcome, and 
there are now clear-cut signs for an improvement of the policy dialogue. 
The EC and the bilateral donors in particular see budget support as an 
instrument well suited to entering into a policy dialogue with the Ethiopian 
government on a number of critical questions, including e.g. budget-
related issues. Until then this avenue had been open only to the World 
Bank and the IMF. 
While budget support is a relatively new instrument in Ethiopia, other 
ACP countries have been provided budget support for roughly four years 
now, and the process is accompanied by a comprehensive and intensive 
dialogue between donors and government. In Mozambique the govern-
ment and its donors hold regular consultations on the support provided and 
Figure 7: Provision of direct, untargeted budget support 
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progress made in implementing the country's PRSPs. The discussion cul-
ture that has developed between donors and government is an open and 
productive one that is marked in particular by a willingness to engage in a 
targeted debate on budget matters. In Uganda dialogue with the govern-
ment has moved on to concentrate on cross-cutting issues concerning 
poverty reduction and PRSP implementation, instead of focusing exclu-
sively on the efficiency of individual donor interventions.94  
In the context of untargeted budget support, effective use of the EDF funds 
provided hinges on the quality of public financial management and control 
procedures in partner countries. The procedures used for budget support 
are the same as those applied for the public expenditures of partner coun-
tries, that is, they are subject to the same internal controls and thus the 
same risks as expenditures covered by national financial resources. Since 
2000 numerous ACP countries have taken steps to initiate comprehensive 
reform programs aimed at strengthening their public financial manage-
ment. This is of course a complex and long-term process, and in its initial 
phase it is not possible to rule out certain shortcomings in the proper and 
effective use of the budget support provided. It is the EC's responsibility to 
gradually reduce these risks by encouraging partner countries to embark 
on a concrete course of reform implementation.95  
Efficient support of comprehensive budgetary reforms presupposes close 
cooperation between the EC, together with other donors of budget support, 
and national oversight authorities. Many older financing proposals failed 
to precisely define and coordinate the roles of the individual actors in-
volved. Nor is it sufficiently clear what instruments the EC plans to use to 
assess pubic budget management and progress on reforms in partner coun-
tries. In connection with the transition to untargeted budget support, sub-
stantial efforts have been made to more precisely define measures in the 
field of spending controls and to intensify coordination with other donors, 
as more recent financing proposals clearly indicate (see Chapter 4.4). 
                                                          
94 See ODI / OPM (2002, 28). 
95 See Europäischer Rechnungshof (2001a, 16). 
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4.1.2 Time horizon and program structure 
The EC defines a pluriannual timeframe for its budget-support programs. 
As far as possible, these should be three-year programs that are adapted to 
the timeframe of national PRSs and BWI programs (PRSC and PRGF). 
Steps should be taken to ensure that with the PRSs strategic priorities be 
defined for all important policy fields and that funds available over the 
medium term be allocated in keeping with these priorities requires partner 
countries to engage in realistic and forward-looking budget planning. 
Under pluriannual donor programs budget support tends to be more pre-
dictable, and such programs help partners to assess their future financial 
scopes at an early point of time and to take timely steps to counteract any 
undesirable financial developments. 
The EC shows clear-cut signs of a tendency toward longer-term programs. 
While the budget supports approved in 2001 had a one-year term, those 
approved in 2003 are to run for three years. The support is to be disbursed 
in several tranches, with a distinction being made between fixed and vari-
able tranches. The rule is to be disbursement of one fixed and one variable 
tranche per year (see Figure 8). 
European budget support is based on the principle of fixed tranches. These 
are designed to improve the economic and financial balance in partner 
countries and are used in coordination with the IMF; as a rule the dis-
bursement of the fixed tranche is conditioned on a partner's implementa-
tion of a macroeconomic program coordinated with the IMF. There are 
only two options: Either the full sum originally earmarked is disbursed or 
disbursement is suspended. There is no provision for reducing the fixed 
tranche for reasons, say, of problems encountered in the course of imple-
menting the macroeconomic strategy agreed on. 
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The volume of the variable tranche is keyed to the contribution of budget 
support to improving the situation in priority sectors. These include health 
and education and public financial management. Disbursement of the 
variable tranche is linked to outcome indicators coordinated with the part-
ner government. If the targets agreed upon are not fully reached, the 
tranche is reduced accordingly96 (see Chapter 4.3). Although the variable 
                                                          
96 The proportion of the variable tranche that is, in the end, not disbursed is paid into the 
national indicative programs (NIPs) of ACP countries. 
Figure 8: The structure of EU budget-support programs 
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tranche is not directly conditioned on the implementation of a macroeco-
nomic program, the tranche is not disbursed if the IMF assesses macro-
economic progress as insufficient and suspends its own support. 
Most of the budget-support programs adopted between 2000 and 2003 
distinguish between a fixed and a variable tranche. Over 70 % of financing 
proposals provide for disbursement in one or more variable tranches. On 
the whole, we can make out a clear-cut trend toward the use of variable 
tranches, and in 2003, for the first time, all financing proposals adopted by 
the EDF make use of the variable tranche as a vehicle for disbursing 
budget support. 
Although the guidelines contain no rules on splitting up the overall volume 
of budget support into fixed and variable tranches, the practice that has 
developed is to assign a weight of 50 % to each tranche type (see Fig. 9). 
For the first year, many programs, e.g. in Benin, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, 
and Mozambique, provide a relatively small sum as a variable tranche and 
then increase the sum in subsequent years at the expense of the fixed 
tranche. Only a small number of financing proposals provide any justifica-
tion of the way in which funds are assigned to the two tranche types. One 
exception is the financing proposal for Tanzania. Of all the programs un-
der consideration, the budget support provided to Zambia is striking for 
the fact that over 90 % of the funds concerned are disbursed in the form of 
a variable tranche.97 The reason for this is doubts on the part of the EC as 
to the Zambian government's willingness to effectively implement the 
reforms agreed upon in the social sectors. The high sums conditioned on 
conformity with the performance indicators is seen as a means to induce 
the government to commit itself to improving services for poorer popula-
tion groups. 
                                                          
97 The total program volume is € 117 million, with 7 million earmarked for TC, 10 million 
disbursed in the form of a fixed tranche, 100 million paid out as a variable tranche. 
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Beside the fixed and variable tranches, an average of 5-10 % of the overall 
volume of budget-support programs is earmarked for technical coopera-
tion. These TC funds are used chiefly to support the following activities:98 
— monitoring of sector policies and PRSPs; 
— monitoring of budget implementation; 
— capacity-building in the fields of budgetary planning and external and 
internal oversight (e.g. efforts to strengthen auditing authorities and 
parliamentary control); 
— improvement of public financial management; 
— preparation of specific studies. 
                                                          
98 See EC (2004a, 15). 
Figure 9: Fixed and variable tranches as a percentage of total volume  
 of support 
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No uniform program structure is stipulated for the sector budget support 
provided by the EC. The support is implemented in the framework of a 
SWAP or a sector policy, and the level or number of tranches is derived 
from the annual or medium-term sectoral financial planning of partner 
countries. Here performance-linked variable tranches are given precedence 
over fixed tranches. 
4.2 Embedding the EC's budget support in the PRSP 
process 
One of the aims of the EC's macroeconomic budget support is to 
strengthen partner PRSs by providing contributions to their national budg-
ets. All of the financing proposals for countries that have already adopted 
a PRSP when support was approved address the PRSs and define their 
implementation as a central program objective. 
In the framework of the PRS process partner governments formulate stra-
tegic priorities that are then required to be translated into sector policies 
and programs and implemented through the public budget. The task of the 
donors is to provide partners flanking assistance in budget formulation and 
implementation with a view to translating the goal of poverty reduction 
into realistic and effective programs and to coordinate their DC contribu-
tions with these programs. Whether or not EC budget-support programs 
are aligned with national PRSs hinges – apart from substantive coherence 
with their PRSPs – on the manner in which they are embedded in the na-
tional PRSP and budget process. 
To ensure that budget-support programs are consistent with the substance 
of PRSPs, the criteria on which disbursement is conditioned need to be 
based on targets formulated by national decision-makers in the framework 
of their poverty-reduction strategies. In the past is was rare for policy 
matrices to be worked out and imposed from the outside. This is why one 
of the EC's important concerns is "to draw its variable tranche indicators 
and targets from the PRSPs and associated Annual Reviews"99 (see Chap-
ter 4.3.3). One exception here must be seen in the conditions set for public 
financial management. Most PRSPs deal only marginally with public 
                                                          
99 EC (2004b, 6). 
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financial management and thus do not provide a sufficient basis to monitor 
weaknesses and progress in this field so central to budget support. 
Embedding budget support in the PRSP and budget process is intended to 
provide relief for partner capacities and to reduce transaction costs. Exces-
sive strains on capacities in partner countries can best be avoided when 
DC contributions are monitored on the basis of national systems, i.e. when 
they are used to track the implementation of PRSs. As a rule annual pro-
gress reviews (APRs) are used to document and review PRS implementa-
tion. Of the 42 countries that have prepared a final PRSP, 23 have already 
conducted one or more APRs, and the average time between these APRs is 
roughly 14 months.100 The EC has come out in favor of making use of the 
results of these PRSP monitorings. "Joint Budget Support processes 
should be constructed to base their review of implementation on the coun-
try's domestic review of progress, which would normally be its Annual 
Review of PRSP."101 However, most countries are still in the process of 
developing their PRSP monitoring systems. Both recipients and donors see 
themselves faced with difficulties in collecting and processing viable sec-
toral data as well as in assessing public-sector contributions to reaching 
the growth targets they have defined. Furthermore, thus far only a limited 
number of countries have succeeded in involving their parliaments and 
civil society in the discussion on their performance and the success they 
have met with in implementing their PRSs and in establishing the APRs as 
a national control instrument for monitoring government performance 
(accountability).102 As far as the monitoring of EC budget-support pro-
grams is concerned, most financing proposals indicate their intention to 
make use of the annual progress reviews. Moreover, a good part of TC-
related budget-support contributions are earmarked for the further devel-
opment of PRSP monitoring systems as well as for support for APRs. 
Making use of national APRs not only eases the strain on partner capac- 
ities, it also has far-reaching implications for the budget process. If the 
results of the progress reviews are available in time, they can be used to 
make adjustments to counter deviations from goals and unforeseen devel-
opments and to incorporate these adjustments into the budget-planning 
                                                          
100 See IDA (2004, 10 f.). 
101 EC (2004b, 7). 
102 See ODI (2004, 15 f.). 
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process for the next financial year. Donors that condition aid disbursement 
on an APR are in this case able to inform the government concerned, even 
before it prepares its budget, of the exact volume they will be providing 
for the coming financial year and to disburse the funds at the beginning of 
the financial year. This serves to increase aid predictability and enable 
partners to come up with a more realistic appraisal of the financial re-
sources actually available to them in the financial year in question. Mo-
zambique is one example of a country where donor contributions and EC 
budget support have been successfully embedded in the national PRSP and 
budget calendar (Box 2). 
However, despite appreciable progress, many partner countries have re-
mained below expectations in their efforts both to translate their PRSs into 
national budgets and in embedding donor contributions in their PRSP and 
budget calendars. While most PRSPs do concentrate on the poverty-
oriented composition of their public expenditures, focusing in particular on 
the social sectors, they still have little practical usefulness for the budget 
process because the strategic priorities set tend to be very global and cost-
ing practices are as a rule underdeveloped.103 APRs are often conducted 
too late to permit the results to be used for planning for the next budget. In 
addition, only a limited number of countries have the medium-term finan-
cial planning capacities that are of central importance in harnessing and 
using long-term cross-sectoral strategies like the PRSs.104 The difficulties 
involved in deriving detailed budget planning from the PRSPs are not the 
least reason for the fact that only roughly half of the financing proposals 
under consideration here provide figures on the percentage that support 
accounts for in a given budget. The debate over the structural adjustment 
support previously provided to boost balances of payments focused on the 
size of funding gaps and the associated need for external financing. The 
                                                          
103 IMF (2004, 8). 
104 One important instrument used for medium-term expenditure planning is the so-called 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which only a limited number of count-
ries have already prepared or implemented. See Holmes / Evans (2003). The framework 
is used to align the budget-planning process to political-strategic priorities and to ensure 
that medium-term funds are allocated in keeping with these priorities. The MTEF con-
cept consists of three pillars: a medium-term estimate of the financial resources avai-
lable; a medium-term cost estimate for sector programs; and the political-administrative 
decision-making process involved in coordinating available resources with resource 
needs. See Le Houerou / Taliercio (2002, 2ff.); Leiderer (2004, 9 f.). 
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macroeconomic data needed to estimate financing needs were available in 
these cases. On the other hand, attempts to calculate the external financing 
needed to implement a given PRS remain problematic as long as a county 
lacks an appropriate system of budget planning, and data on the share 
accounted for by support in a given budget are not particularly viable. 
As far as the way in which donor contributions are embedded in the PRSP 
and budget calendar is concerned, a study conducted by the Strategic Part-
nership with Africa (SPA) on 18 sub-Saharan African countries found a 
number of substantial deficits.105 Even in countries whose PRSP cycles are 
coordinated with their national budget calendars, it is difficult for donors 
to align their contributions with national procedural sequences. In nearly 
all ACP countries the EC is part of a group of budget-support donors 
whose aim it is to provide assistance on the basis of coordinated proce-
dures. The experience made thus far indicates that alignment with national 
calendars is problematic above all when a country is already cooperating 
closely with the World Bank and the donor group aligns its missions with 
the Bank's PRSC appraisal talks. Incongruencies between donor missions 
and decisions and national PRSP and budget calendars have been a prob-
lem in e.g. Ethiopia, where the donor group has only recently been consti-
tuted and is aligning its activities with the procedures of the World Bank 
(see Box 3). 
Some donors have noted critically that the variable tranche concept under-
cuts the predictability of the EC's budget support. This charge is unjusti-
fied because, in the ideal case, the size of the variable tranche for financial 
year n+1 is determined in year n, which means that partner governments 
are informed before the financial year gets underway of the amount to be 
disbursed. Should this not be the case, the reason will as a rule have to be 
sought not in the adoption a variable tranche per se but in the fact that the 
program is insufficiently embedded in the budget calendar, as e.g. in the 
case of Ethiopia. 
To sum up, in its budget-support guidelines the EC set the course for em-
bedding EC budget support in the PRSs of partner countries. Some deficits 
encountered in implementing the EC's performance targets are due to both 
weaknesses in partner countries, e.g. problems with the quality of PRSP 
                                                          
105 See SPA (2004). 
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monitoring, and difficulties on the part of the EC in keying its work to 
national calendars, despite the timeframes it itself sets. Really all contribu-
tions of the donor group to which the EC belongs are affected by this lack 
of alignment with the PRSP and budget calendars of partner countries. It 
often takes several budget cycles to optimally align budget support with 
national procedural sequences. The EC is, generally speaking, very willing 
to continue on the course it has set out and to orient its activities to na-
tional calendars. 
4.3 Conditionality reform 
In the framework of its new budget-support concept the EC has under-
taken a comprehensive reform of its practice of conditionality. Since 2000 
the EC has conditioned its support no longer on the implementation of 
policy measures, but on outcomes. The new approach is a reaction to the 
disappointing experiences made with traditional conditionality in the con-
text of structural adjustment:  
— In the past, conditionalities were often too detailed. This, together 
with a lack of donor coordination, frequently led to the formulation of 
incoherent and not very plausible conditionalities that recipient coun-
tries saw more as a necessary ill than as a useful reform strategy.106  
— Generally, conditionalities were about enforcing macroeconomic 
measures, which did little or nothing to improve social services for 
the poor.  
— The ‘stop and go’ character of the system, in which tranches were 
either disbursed in full or else completely deferred, disrupted the 
budget process in the partner countries.  
— Traditional conditions were an obstacle to reform ownership by the 
recipient countries. The rules, after all, were determined externally. 
However, sufficient ownership is a sine qua non for the success of re-
forms.107 In the long run, imposed measures that lacked the backing 
of national stakeholders have seldom been able to exert sufficient and 
durable influence on national policies.108  
                                                          
106 See Adam et. al (2004, 2). 
107 See Kahn / Sharma (2001, 13 ff.). 
108 See, among others, Morrissey (2004, 168); DFID (2004, 6). 
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Against this background, the new EC approach is meant to strengthen the 
result orientation of both donors and recipients. Furthermore, the idea is to 
ensure that the government in question has scope for policy choices, with 
donors taking a back seat in matters of program implementation. The aim 
is to encourage national accounting systems and to reward successful 
policies, while conditionalities are expected to be derived from the PRSPs. 
The EC for the first time integrated performance-based conditionality in a 
budget-support program in 1999, in connection with a pilot project on 
conditionality-reform in Burkina Faso, and it has since gradually trans-
formed its practice of conditionality.109  
4.3.1 Evaluation levels and introduction of outcome 
indicators 
In determining the particular conditionalities for budget support, the 
Commission identified four stages of development cooperation: input, 
output, outcome and impact.110 Indicators are defined in such a way as to 
make evaluation possible at the various levels.  
— Input indicators measure the actions and financial, administrative, 
and regulatory resources which are put into the development process; 
these may include e.g. seminars, workshops, working time, adoption 
of legislation, etc. Conditions at the input level are also referred to as 
process conditionality. 
— Output indicators measure the concrete and immediate conse-
quences of the measures taken and resources used (these may include 
e.g. the number of schools built or teachers trained). 
— Outcome indicators measure the results and positive changes at the 
target-group level. Alternatively, the terms results or performance in-
dicators are used instead (these may include e.g. school enrolment 
rates, the percentage of girls who have been enrolled in school). 
— Impact indicators measure the actually intended impacts or the 
paramount objectives of an intervention, which as a rule is based on 
several outcomes (literacy rate, unemployment rate, etc.). 
                                                          
109 See Zongo / Coulibary (2000). 
110 See EC (2000d, 3). 
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In its budget support programs, the Commission focuses on outcome indi-
cators (Fig.2). Conventional conditionality focussed on the implementa-
tion of policy measures and their direct effects, but this has done very little 
to improve social services for the poor. It has become evident that in-
creases in health budgets or the construction of new health centers does 
not necessarily mean increases in the number of patients treated. In Burk-
ina Faso the number of clients even decreased in spite of additional health 
centers. 
It therefore makes sense to use result/outcome indicators. Furthermore, 
results-based conditions increase the partner countries’ autonomy by safe-
guarding their scope in regard to the means and methods applied. This is 
intended to strengthen partner ownership of programs and to induce part-
ner governments to focus on the situation of target groups. Since many 
result indicators reflect changes in the provision of social services, which 
can be assessed by the population, these indicators are also better suited 
for accountability purposes than input indicators. While impact indicators 
would be preferable in the sense that they address the overarching goals of 
development, they are difficult to define and their use only makes sense 
over the long-term. They are for this reason rarely applied. 
In its budget-support programs the EC's aim is to concentrate on outcome 
indicators: "The purpose of the […new approach] is to evolve from the 
traditional conditionalities (requiring governments to implement measures/ 
conditions) towards performance indicators."111 However, it has restricted 
the use of outcome indicators to the variable tranche, which is targeted to 
sectors defined as prioritary: "Such indicators may be designed to reflect 
improvements in public services offered to populations in the health and 
education sectors and improved efficiency in certain sectors, such as jus-
tice and especially the management of public finances, which are deemed 
to be priority sectors."112 Process conditionalities continue to be required 
for the fixed tranche. 
In recent years outcome-oriented conditionalities have become an impor-
tant building block of European budget support. 73 % of the EC's budget-
                                                          
111 EC (2002, 3). 
112 Ibid. For indicators in the field of public financial management, the EC indicates, in 
some documents and diagrams, its intention to use efficiency indicators. The term has, 
however, not been defined. 
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support programs condition disbursement on – among other things – per-
formance-based indicators. A further 20 % of programs call on partner 
governments to formulate a list of outcome indicators and to coordinate 
them with the EC. Only then are the funds released. Only a limited number 
of financing proposals make no reference at all to performance-based 
conditionalities. Furthermore, the number of programs that provide exclu-
sively for traditional conditionalities has been constantly declining. In 
2003 all of the budget support approved by the EDF contained perform-
ance-based elements (Fig. 10). 
The release of the fixed tranche, which is used for purposes of macroeco-
nomic stabilization in partner countries, is oriented to economic reform 
programs coordinated with the BWIs (Fig. 11). The conditions set have 
process character and are keyed first to satisfactory implementation of the 
BWI macroeconomic programs and second to progress in the PRSP pro-
cess. The EC's aim is to avoid any more extensive conditionalities.113 The 
                                                          
113 See EC (n.d., 2). 
Figure 10: Use of performance indicators for the variable tranche 
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majority of the fixed tranches of the budget-support programs adopted by 
the EDF Committee between 2000 and 2003 contain conditionalities that 
go beyond the two criteria referred to above. Thirteen programs set addi-
tional conditionalities for public financial management, seven formulate 
additional conditions for other core sectors like education and transporta-
tion. To cite an example, in Benin disbursement of the fixed tranche is 
conditioned on presentation of a strategy paper for the education sector.114 
The Rwandan program additionally links disbursement of the fixed 
tranche to indicators for the judicial sector as well as for regional integra-
tion. 
 
                                                          
114 See Benin/358, 6. 
Figure 11: Use of process conditionality for the fixed tranche 
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Table 3 sums up the way in which conditionality reform has been imple-
mented. What we see is a clear-cut trend toward programs that both spec-
ify no detailed policy measures for the fixed tranche and use outcome 
indicators for the variable tranche. But even in 2003 some programs were 
adopted that still contained process conditionalities. In addition, imple-
mentation of performance-based elements does not mean that all variable-
tranche indicators are outcome indicators. On the one hand, it is difficult to 
define outcome indicators for certain priority sectors such as the public 
financial management; on the other hand, input indicators are still often 
defined for the health and education sectors. 
Table 3: Introduction of the new conditionality in the EU's 
 budget support programs 
 No 
process condi-
tionality 
Process condi-
tionality only for 
public finance 
management 
Extensive use of 
process 
conditionality 
Use of indica-
tors 
8 programs:  
Benin 379,  
Burkina Faso 
358 and 370,  
Ethiopia 373 
and 377,  
Jamaica 373, 
Mauritania 359, 
Tanzania 376 
6 programs: Gha-
na 365,  
Mali 379,  
Mozambique 372, 
Niger 376,  
Rwanda 378, Zam-
bia 379 
6 programs:  
Benin 358, 
Chad 358, 
Guinea Bissau 354,  
Lesotho 359,  
Rwanda 358, 
Zambia 353 
Definition of 
indicators 
1 program:  
Kenya 356 
6 programs:  
CAR 358, Chad 
378, Jamaica 360, 
Mali 365, Mozam-
bique 358, Tanza-
nia 360 
2 programs:  
Burundi 373,  
Cameroon 358 
No indicators 0 programs 0 programs 1 program:  
Ethiopia 364 
 
Source: Own presentation 
Variable 
Tranche
Fixed 
Tranche 
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The transition to performance-based conditionality is most clearly marked 
in the education sector. 73.4 % percent of education-related indicators are 
outcome indicators, whereas output indicators are dominant in the area of 
public financial management. Only 2 % of these indicators can be re-
garded as outcome-oriented. In all, 43.2 % of the indicators used for the 
variable tranche are outcome indicators (Fig, 12). 
On the whole, there is still room to expand the use of performance-based 
conditionality, even though problems involved in defining outcome indica-
tors for public financial management make it unlikely that process condi-
tionalities will be completely abandoned for the variable tranche. 
4.3.2 Outcome-oriented tranche disbursement 
One innovative aspect of the EC approach to budget support is the gradual 
reduction of payments when the performance of recipient countries re-
mains unsatisfactory. Generally, the situation in partner countries is nei-
ther completely satisfactory nor completely disappointing. The Commis-
sion has shifted from a binary (“yes/no”) allocation system to a continuous 
Figure 12: Percentage of input, output, and outcome indicators for the 
 sectors education, PFM, health 
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(“more or less”) system which provides for disbursement of the variable 
tranche keyed to the results achieved by partner countries. 
The idea of the new approach is to improve the predictability of support 
and to strengthen its credibility.115 In cases of poor performance the per-
formance-linked variable tranches of pluriannual EC programs are not 
suspended but reduced in part, an approach that serves to enhance the 
planning stability of partner governments. This model permits the EC to 
respond flexibly to partner weaknesses and at the same time to enforce the 
conditions set. In the past conditionalities have often been undermined at 
the expense of their credibility so as not to endanger the continuation of 
support. 
Allocations are calculated as follows. First, a certain share of the tranche is 
assigned to each indicator. If the objective expected is achieved, this par-
tial amount is paid out in full. If there has been progress, though not as 
much as expected, only half of the tranche is disbursed. If the results are 
unsatisfactory, the money is withheld (Fig. 3). Each indicator thus contrib-
utes to determining the total amount of the variable tranche to be trans-
ferred. 
Thorough consideration should be given to the weighting assigned to the 
various sectors and the sum allocated to each individual indicator.116 The 
consequence of poor performance in one sector or on one indicator is 
reduction of the variable tranche. As a rule the indicators are weighted 
equally within each sector.117 If e.g. five indicators are defined for a given 
sector, each indicators has a weight of 0.2. If a beneficiary country fails to 
meet one indicator, it will receive 20 % less of the funds made available 
for the sector.118 Only in a small number of cases do financing agreements 
assign special importance to certain goals within a sector, giving them 
greater weight than others. To cite an example, Tanzania receives 10 % of 
the sum earmarked for public financial management if it conducts anti-
corruption measures, whereas 20 % of the same sum is conditioned on 
preparation of the budget (see Tanzania/376). In Benin the number of 
                                                          
115 EC (n.d.), 7; EC (2004a, 10). 
116 See AIDCO / DEV/ RELEX (2002, 43). 
117 See the programs Benin/358; Burkina Faso/358; Guinea Bissau/354; Mali/379; 
Chad/358. 
118 Accordingly, a tranche is calculated on basis of the formula (n/a) x b. 
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assisted births is weighted higher than a rising health budget (see Be-
nin/379). 
If we look at the variable tranche as a whole, we find that the indicators 
associated with public financial management are weighted higher than the 
indicators for education and health. On average, 4.8 indicators are defined 
for public financial management, and this, assuming that all indicators are 
weighted equally, would mean an allocation of 31.7 %. In all, however, 
nearly 39 % of funds are linked to conditions in the area of public financial 
management, as is indicated by the percentaged distribution of the variable 
tranche across the individual sectors. One quarter of the funds available is 
planned in for the health and education sector. Compared with the struc-
tural adjustment aids of the past, the number of indicators is both low and 
in line with the demand that disbursement should be linked to a low num-
ber of concrete indicators that reflect the complexity of a given sector (Fig. 
13).119 
As a rule financing proposals contain no substantive comments on the 
weighting of indicators in the education, health, and public finance sectors. 
                                                          
119 See KOM (2002a, 22); AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 43). 
Figure 13: Number of indicators in budget-support programs 
 
Source: Own presentation 
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The same goes for the way in which funds are allocated across sectors. 
The proposals often make reference only to the importance of priority 
sectors for poverty reduction or explain the decision to accord special 
weight to public financial management. It is for this reason not possible to 
use the financing proposals as a basis for conducting a qualitative assess-
ment of fund allocation. 
Decisions on whether targets have been met or not are taken in coordina-
tion with the governments of beneficiary countries. The EC is wholly 
against any purely mathematical interpretation of the indicators. All inter-
nal and external effects that may affect goal attainment must be taken into 
consideration. Possible effects of external factors on goal attainment have 
to be isolated in order to be able to pinpoint the responsibility of a partner 
government. Indicators that are not met because of natural disasters or the 
like are eliminated from the assessment. To cite an example, because of 
the flood disaster in Mozambique in 2000, the EC did not insist that targets 
be reached in the education sector. 
The indicators were designed to be ambitious enough to reflect progress 
and realistic enough to ensure that partner sector strategies are in fact 
supported. This calls for close cooperation with sector experts. Data on the 
disbursement of the variable tranche indicate that the indicators used are 
balanced. Between 2001 and 2002 an average of 70 % of the maximum 
amount of the variable tranche was disbursed. Using the example of 
Ethiopia, Annex 6 shows how a variable tranche is calculated. In most 
points the EC delegation and the Ethiopian government reached agreement 
on the extent to which indicator targets had been met. The parties differed 
only on two indicators. In all, 64.5 % of the variable tranche was dis-
bursed. 
Whether the indicators and targets involved in budget support are appro-
priate in substantive terms and do justice to the problem situations in indi-
vidual partner countries is a question that can be looked into only for indi-
vidual cases and on the basis of a detailed analysis of sector data and 
strategies.120 Even so, the most commonly used indicators are embedded in 
cross-cutting concepts that should be used in preparing financing propos-
als. 
                                                          
120 The EC speaks of "SMART Indicators": specific, measurable, accepted by all involved, 
realistic, timed. 
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4.3.3 Indicator content and explanatory power 
Partner ownership is accorded a central role in the discussion on budget 
support and similar instruments. If these cannot be assumed for a partner, 
there is no way to ensure that budget support will be put to proper use.121 If 
the targets stipulated by donor programs are to do justice to the principle 
of ownership, they must be coordinated with the strategies of recipient 
countries. As experience has shown, imposed measures that are not backed 
by national stakeholders are seldom able to influence national policy in the 
long run.122 This is why the EC, in defining indicators and targets for EC 
budget support, accords priority to ensuring that they are aligned with 
national strategies. "As far as possible, the indicators should be identified 
in the PRSP or the governments policy documents."123 Many PRSPs con-
tain a list of indicators that can be used to derive the indicators for EC 
budget support. A one-to-one adoption of such indicators is not recom-
mendable only in the case that the way in which PRS matrices or targets 
have been prepared still appears uneven or changes are already anticipated 
for some targets. The indicators and/or targets for many first-generation 
PRSPs have been adapted over the course of time, a fact that makes it 
difficult to use these data for orientation. Furthermore, most poverty 
strategies do not define targets for public financial management, which 
means that PFM indicators must be taken from other strategy papers. 
The majority of financing proposals note that indicators have either been 
taken from PRSPs or are based on them. Statements like this, however, do 
no mean that any 100 % conformity with partner poverty strategies is 
necessarily given. Although e.g. the financing proposal on Burkina Faso 
explicitly notes that the indicators used for the EC's budget support were 
selected from the country's PRSP, only six of nine indicators for the health 
sector were consistent with the PRSP matrix. There were also three indica-
tors that were not mentioned in the country's PRSP. By contrast, the indi-
cators for Mozambique's health and education sectors are identical with 
those set out in the country's PRSP. A small number of financing propos-
als aim solely for "coherence" with the indicators from partner PRSPs. 
                                                          
121 See Berke (2002, 2f.); Brown et al. (2001, 8 ff.). 
122 See i.a. Morrissey (2004, 168); DFID (2004, 6). 
123 See AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 43). 
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Only in exceptional cases do financing proposals fail to make any state-
ments at all on the PRSP relevance of indicators (e.g. Chad/378). 
On the whole, the EC's budget-support programs still make too little use of 
PRSP indicators. One reason for this is that the PRSP matrices are often 
prepared under considerable time pressure and do not meet the standards 
for relevant outcome indicators. On the other hand, though, this is also a 
clear sign of how difficult it is to accord serious attention to the ownership 
and policy-shaping capacities of partner countries in relation to develop-
ment goals and to consistently align budget-support programs to national 
strategies. In the coming years, once the first three-year cycle has come to 
an end, many partner countries will be developing a new generation of 
PRSPs that make use of the results of the PRSP evaluations available and 
will be expected to address the weakness of the first-generation PRSPs. In 
many countries the continuing discussions on lists of the most important 
indicators will by then have led to the formulation of sound matrices that 
are used in the second-generation PRSs and make it easier for the donors 
to apply their PRSP indicators. 
As a rule PRSPs constitute a planning framework for all important policy 
fields, and most PRSP matrices are accordingly comprehensive. It can also 
be observed that many PRSPs contain a highly detailed list of indicators 
instead of concentrating on a small number of core indicators. In selecting 
indicators from these PRSP matrices, the EC seeks orientation in the 
MDGs adopted by the international community in the UN's Millennium 
Declaration of September 2000. In monitoring the eight MDGs, UNDP 
uses 48 indicators which are also used in EC budget-support programs – 
assuming they occur in a given PRSP. With a view to further specifying 
the European approach, the EC has furthermore issued a set of monitoring 
guidelines for the health and education sectors which set out the most 
important indicators.  
As regards education, the EC distinguishes three aspects that are required 
to assess progress in the education sector: access to education, educational 
system efficiency, and learning results.124 Access to education is measured 
on the basis of net or gross enrolment rates. Enrolment rates are important 
indicators in the context of the MDGs, and this parameter also figures 
                                                          
124 See EC (2003d, 6 ff.). 
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importantly in the EC's budget-support programs, turning up in 19 of 30 
financing proposals. But neither of the two enrolment rates indicates how 
many years of schooling students actually complete. In the extreme case, 
rising enrolment rates may go hand in hand with declining figures for 
years of schooling actually completed. It therefore makes sense to couple 
the "enrolment" indicator with an indicator that measures educational 
system efficiency and contains information on completed years of school-
ing. "Primary-school completion rate" or "percentage of first graders who 
reach the fifth year of schooling" are used as alternatives. The majority of 
financing proposals provide for a combination of access and efficiency 
indicators. It is more difficult to measure educational levels or the learning 
results achieved by students in different educational systems. Some financ-
ing proposals seek to do justice to this need by monitoring the ratios be-
tween students and teachers (Fig. 14). 
 
Figure 14: The five most frequent indicators used for the education sector 
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The EC's orientation guide on measuring progress in the health sector 
makes reference to MDGs four, five, and six and recommends the follow-
ing outcome indicators for EC programs and country strategies: percentage 
of one-year-olds vaccinated against measles, percentage of one-year-olds 
with a complete set of vaccinations, percentage of assisted births, percent-
age of the population covered by the social security system, and dissemi-
nation of contraceptives. Most financing proposals make reference to 
vaccination rates and assisted births and focus on reduction of child and 
maternal mortality (Fig. 15). 
No orientation guides have been issued for other priority sectors. As far as 
public financial management is concerned, the EC orients its efforts to the 
work of the PEFA initiative (see Chapter 4.5). 
Figure 15: The five most frequent indicators for the health sector 
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If indicators are to come up with reliable information on the development 
of priority sectors, there is a need for efficient systems for collecting and 
processing statistical data. Only a small number of financing proposals 
make reference to the quality of the data on which they are based.125 On 
the other hand, most mention the sources on which monitoring is to be 
based. Furthermore, the TC components of most programs provide for 
efforts to strengthen monitoring systems. 
4.4 Assessing public financial management in partner 
countries 
4.4.1 Public financial management in program-oriented 
development cooperation 
The debate on a more marked program orientation of DC has now come to 
focus on the quality of public financial management in partner countries. 
The effectiveness of public financial management is relevant in two differ-
ent respects. On the one hand, the high fiduciary risks involved in provid-
ing budget support and similar instruments calls for a certain minimum 
level of transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency of public financial 
management to ensure that the instruments are used successfully. Only the 
other hand, it is precisely the provision of budget support and flanking 
measures that is expected to contribute to strengthening public financial 
management by promoting reforms in partner countries and easing strains 
on national capacities. The aim here is – not least – to boost the effective-
ness of partner governments in implementing their PRSPs. 
We can distinguish here seven basic elements of public financial manage-
ment that are relevant in providing budget support:126  
— shaping the institutional and legal budget framework; 
— strategic planning and budget formulation; 
— budget preparation; 
— budget implementation; 
                                                          
125 See e.g. Burkina Faso/370, Ethiopia/368. 
126 See i.a. Leiderer (2004), World Bank (1998), World Bank (2003). 
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— accounting and monitoring; 
— financial reporting and auditing; 
— information management, provision of technical and personnel ca-
pacities. 
Developing countries are typically faced with a number of financial man-
agement problems that adversely affect the quality of budget management 
as regards these seven elements. Most of these problems are due to lacking 
or inadequate institutions, limited technical or personnel capacities, and 
governance deficits.127 One particularly serious problem must be seen in 
the need to reform public budget systems in the HIPCs. This is the finding 
of a joint study conducted in 2002 by the IMF and the World Bank that 
looked into whether and to what extent poverty-targeted funds can be 
tracked on the basis of existing national budget management systems.128 
For 15 of the 24 countries it covered, the study found substantial weak-
nesses in public financial management, and for the remaining nine coun-
tries it found some deficits that are in need of improvement. Numerous 
countries have, with donor support, already initiated comprehensive re-
forms designed to gradually improve their budget systems. The EC is 
participating in this process by monitoring and assessing the both weak 
points in public financial administrations and progress that has been made 
in connection with budget-support programs. 
4.4.2 Assessing public financial management in the 
framework of EC budget support: instruments  
and principles of action 
In its Communication of February 4, 2000, on structural adjustment aids, 
the EC sees in the quality of public financial management an important 
key to the success of untargeted budget support in the ACP countries. In 
its Special Report 5/2001, the European Court of Auditors follows this 
view and recommends that improvement of public financial management 
be accorded high priority. It recommends that budget support be condi-
tioned on a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the finan-
                                                          
127 See Leiderer (2004, 7 ff.). 
128 See IMF / IDA (2001). 
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cial administrations of partner countries that leads to a reform strategy. 
Second, it calls for continuous and donor-coordinated assessment and 
documentation of progress in public financial management. The Court of 
Auditors calls on the EC to take measures and to develop instruments that 
can be used to asses the quality of public financial management and the 
actual progress that has been made in this area. 
In its guidelines on the provision of budget support, the EC defines the 
principles and instruments to be used in assessing public financial man-
agement in partner countries. The guidelines see an ex ante assessment of 
pubic financial management as an essential eligibility criterion for budget 
support. This assessment should cover the following areas: 
— description and analysis of the legal and legislative framework; 
— review of flows of funds, in particular to the social sectors; 
— assessment of the reporting and monitoring standards of internal and 
external auditing institutions; 
— selection of performance indicators for public financial management. 
This ex ante assessment of public financial management is expected to be 
conducted using the customary diagnostic tools developed in particular by 
the BWIs in the 1980s and 1990s (CFAA, PER, CPAR, ROSC, etc.). To-
gether with other donors, the EC is in favor of systematically involving 
partner countries in conducting these analyses or making targeted use of 
them in preparing financing proposals. "The assessment of public finances 
should be based on work already done by the country on its own or jointly 
with other downers."129 Such diagnoses of public finances have already 
been conducted for most partner countries. Wherever this is not the case, 
the EC, if possible together with other donors, will conduct comprehensive 
analyses prior to granting budget support. The summary ex ante assess-
ment is expected to be appended to every financing proposal and to ex-
plain what diagnostic procedures the assessment is based on. 
Thus far the financing proposals have not devoted sufficient attention to 
public financial management systems. Only half of all financing proposals 
contain an assessment of the public finances of the partner country under 
consideration. Considerable improvements have, though, been noted in 
                                                          
129 AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 39). 
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recent years. While not one of the financing proposals approved in 2000 
contains a comprehensive analysis of the public financial management 
systems in question, all of those prepared in 2003 are accompanied by a 
diagnosis of public financial management (Fig. 16). 
The EC is fully aware that many ACP countries have weak PFM systems. 
But it is the provision of budget support in the first place that legitimizes a 
comprehensive dialogue between donors and partner governments on 
central issues of budget management. "The improvement of PFM is there-
fore not so much a pre-requisite as a fundamental objective of direct 
budget support, to be gradually reached through a dynamic process."130 
Most of the analyses contained in financing proposals come to the finding 
that the quality of public financial management in the countries concerned 
ranges from unsatisfactory to good, though in most cases with strong res-
ervations (Fig. 17). 
                                                          
130 EC (2004a, 14). 
Figure 16: Assessment of PFM in budget-support-related financing  
 proposals 
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During program implementation the EC monitors the quality of public 
financial management and the actual progress of reforms in partner coun-
tries. The following measures have been stipulated for purposes of regular 
review: 
— Since September 2003 the EC delegations in recipient countries have 
been required to present semiannual monitoring reports on partner 
public financial management; these reports are prepared in a standard 
format stipulated by Brussels. 
— Annual assessments are used to review the overall situation of public 
financial management and appraise weak points in financial admini-
stration that have been identified in previous reviews. The annual as-
sessment requires an approach coordinated with all donors.  
For the annual assessments the EC basically recommends the use of three 
instruments: 
— Cross-cutting assessments of public financial management, e.g. in the 
framework of annual reviews on the implementation of PRSPs or 
based on the traditional diagnostic procedures of the BWIs (CFAA, 
CPAR, ROSC, etc.). 
Figure 17: Results of PFM assessments in financing proposals 
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— The diagnoses are supplemented by compliance tests and audits that 
serve to review actual expenditure and its conformity with the valid 
regulations and procedures. 
— Definition and annual review of performance indicators for public 
financial management are used to verify reforms in this area. 
Thus far, the financing proposals presented have been patchy in their 
statements concerning the continuous analysis of PFM. In the future diag-
noses of public financial management will be required for 19 of 30 pro-
grams. All proposals approved in 2002 and 2003 made reference to the 
need for continuous analysis, while only two of ten program proposals 
presented in 2000 has anything to say about future assessments of public 
financial management. For only roughly 40 % of programs are there any 
plans to conduct compliance tests (Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia). 
The EC makes use of a good number of instruments to assess partner 
PFM-systems, as a rule in coordination with other donors. Figure 18 
shows that only roughly one half of the diagnoses conducted are based on 
CFAs, PERs, or CPARs. Other diagnostic methods and sources of infor-
mation also play an important role here, including e.g. studies that are 
conducted in the framework of a reform program (Ethiopia), focus on 
certain details of a public financial management systems (Chad), or serve 
as pilot studies for the design of a universal analytical framework (Zam-
bia). 
One difficulty involved in analyzing public financial management is that 
the set of instruments commonly used has not yet been integrated to form 
a coordinated system of individual assessment modules. The individual 
tools differ in terms of object of investigation, methodology, and depth of 
analysis, and for this reason only some of them can be used in a comple-
mentary fashion. A given donor's choice of an instrument on which to base 
his financing activities can entail differences in assessments of partner 
weakness and progress in the field of public financial management. This 
makes it difficult to reach agreement on action plans for the reform of 
public financial management that are backed and monitored by all donors 
involved. The EC is for this reason working together with other donors on 
the development of a comprehensive analytical framework that integrates
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the existing analytical tools and is used by all donors. Together with the 
World Bank, the IMF, and DFID, the EC has developed the so-called 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program, at 
present without doubt the most important initiative designed to improve 
and harmonize the analysis of public financial management in developing 
countries. The objective of PEFA is to work out and adopt a universal and 
partner-coordinated diagnostic procedure, the so-called Standardized As-
sessment, which is based on a limited number of indicators.131 A standard-
ized diagnostic procedure would facilitate coordination of an overall plan 
                                                          
131 See e.g. PEFA (2003). 
Figure 18: Number of diagnostic tools used for PFM assessments that are 
 planned or have already been conducted 
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for public financial management reform and serve as a basis for the dia-
logue between donors and partner governments on budget management. 
In formulating indicators and targets in this field, the EC has until now 
relied on the customary analytical tools and the action plans agreed on in 
connection with them. The EC's financing proposals contain an average of 
roughly five conditionalities for PFM. The most frequently used indicator 
is the rate of budget implementation in priority sectors (17), followed by 
target criteria on budget allocation (11) and budget implementation at the 
decentral level (9). Most of these indicators are contained in the list of 
28+2 indicators recommended by PEFA for reviewing budget manage-
ment. With a view to making headway in harmonizing analytical proce-
dures, the EC is presently coordinating ten of 17 pilot projects that are set 
to be used to test the standardized PEFA procedure. Eleven of these pilot 
projects are being conducted in ACP countries in which the Community 
provides budget support (e.g. Burkina Faso, Benin, Madagascar, Tanza-
nia).132 
It may be said by way of summary that direct and untargeted budget sup-
port is sustainable only if it is accompanied by continuous improvements 
in public financial management. In view of the fact that a good number of 
changes are in the making and capacities in recipient countries are limited, 
the task of implementing PFM reforms in partner countries is proving to 
be a complicated and protracted process. The risks bound up with the 
provision of budget support can be reduced only gradually, by monitoring 
and supporting the actual reform processes in partner countries. The EC is 
fully aware of this situation and has laid the groundwork for efficient and 
"low-risk" budget-support programs with its general emphasis on PFM as 
well as with its concrete targets for use in reviewing and accompanying 
PFM reforms. However, implementation of the targets and assessment of 
progress on reforms call for development of expertise in headquarters and 
delegations on the one hand and concerted action on the part of all donors 
on the other. The EC has introduced comprehensive advanced staff train-
ing and training courses as a means of improving analysis quality. In addi-
tion, the staff of delegations is provided support by headquarters PFM 
experts or professional external experts. Even so, the personnel resources 
available to the EC are not sufficient to conduct an overall assessment of 
                                                          
132 See AIDCO / DEV (2004). 
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PFM and actual progress on reforms without coordination with other do-
nors. This applies not only for the EC but for most other budget-support 
doors as well, a fact which serves to underline the importance of donor 
coordination. 
4.5 Donor coordination and EC budget support 
In connection with the ongoing debate on budget support, donor coordina-
tion has become a key issue on the international development agenda. The 
background must be seen in the great number of procedures and structures 
that have been used in the past by donors of development aid – and have 
led to considerable strains on the capacities of partner countries. Empirical 
experience clearly shows that inadequate donor coordination in the im-
plementation of projects and programs leads to higher transaction costs for 
both donors and recipients and undercuts the effectiveness of DC. The aim 
of donor coordination is to counteract these effects and to align DC contri-
butions with strategies formulated by partner countries on their own. 
There are at present a number of initiatives underway in the field of donor 
coordination. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
whose members include both the EC and the EU member states, has 
worked out a number of detailed recommendations that were adopted in 
February 2003 by numerous donors and developing countries in the Rome 
Declaration on Harmonisation.133 The DAC has since created a working 
group on donor harmonization; the group has developed a limited number 
of harmonization indicators and assembled a summary list of good prac-
tices. At the country level, the World Bank is engaged in work in 11 coun-
tries aimed at bringing about donor harmonization.134 A number of donors 
have also presented action plans on donor harmonization (Germany in 
April 2003). 
For its part, the European Community has committed itself to the goal of 
donor coordination. At the Council meeting in Barcelona all EU member 
countries came out in favor of undertaking concrete steps toward a joint 
approach. "[The EU Member States agreed to] take concrete steps on co-
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ordination of policies and harmonisation of procedures before 2004, both 
at EC and Member States level."135 The Ad Hoc Working Party on Har-
monisation recommends that efforts be undertaken to speed up the imple-
mentation of the harmonization commitments agreed to in the Rome Dec-
laration and calls on the European Commission and the member states to 
participate in all multi-donor initiatives in partner countries. A particularly 
important role is seen for donor coordination in connection with budget 
support. 
The budget support the EC provides is geared to supporting macroeco-
nomic reforms and reducing poverty in partner countries. As a rule, sev-
eral donors provide support for partner national PRSs, which means that 
the EC's budget support is complementary to the budget aids provided by 
other donors. "The Commission expects to co-finance all support for 
PRSPs and economic reform and/or sector programmes together with the 
World Bank, the EU Member States, or other bilateral donors."136 And 
macroeconomic reform programs and PRSs call for DC contributions that 
are coordinated and harmonized by the donors. "This will be reflected in 
the negotiation between government and donors of a single framework of 
support in which the same objectives, disbursement schedule, conditions/ 
verification indicators will apply."137 
In connection with the support they provide for PRSPs, donor groups have 
in recent years been constituted in numerous ACP countries to harmonize 
donor contributions. Donors groups have already been set up in ten coun-
tries to coordinate general budget support.138 While some of these groups 
are no more than informal associations, most of them work within an insti-
tutionalized arrangement, the so-called joint partnership framework. It 
defines the basic principles and in some cases also the mechanisms to be 
used in assessing and documenting the progress made by the partner coun-
tries concerned (the so-called performance assessment framework). 
                                                          
135 Council of the European Union (2002, 1f.). 
136 AIDCO / DEV / RELEX (2002, 36). 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ethiopia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tan-
zania, Uganda. In the spring of 2004, groups of budget-support donors were in prepara-
tion in Madagascar, Zambia, and Kenya. 
Petra Schmidt 
 German Development Institute 94
The EC is a member of all of the budget-support groups presently operat-
ing; its aim here is to institutionalize cooperation. According to the guide-
lines, the type and substance of inter-donor cooperation should be set out 
in written form and appended to the financing proposals. At present 
roughly 20 % of all programs are being carried out in the framework of a 
formalized donor group, and informal arrangements are sought and con-
cluded with other donors for approximately half of all programs. Only a 
limited number of financing proposals contain no information on donor 
coordination (Fig. 19). 
Despite the appreciable progress that has been made, there is still room for 
improvement of donor coordination. Joint implementation of budget-
support programs contributes to focusing the political dialogue with part-
ner governments on a limited number of important issues and aligning 
donor contributions with partner PRSPs. This is the case in particular 
when the donors adopt the frame of reference normally used to monitor 
PRSPs and to assess country progress and disburse budget support. What 
this means in effect is that donors are forced to relinquish some of their 
Figure 19: Types of donor coordination in the field of budget support in 
 recipient countries 
 
Source: Own presentation 
23.3% 20.0%
46.7%
Formal donor coordination / existence of
a memorandum of understanding
Informal donor coordination
No information available on coordination
in the field of budget support
Programs conducted in the framework of formal 
donor coordination:
1. Benin:  Appui budgétaire conjoint pour la réduction 
de la pauvreté (2003-2005), 2003
2. Burkina Faso: Appui budgétaire pour la réduction 
de la pauvreté, 2002
3. Mozambique: Poverty Reduction Budget Support I 
(PRBS I), 2000 and PRBS 2, 2003 
4. Mozambique: Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
II (PRBS II) 2002-2005, 2003
5. Tanzania: Poverty Reduction Budget Support for 
FY 01/02 (PRBS 01), 2001
6. Tanzania: Poverty Reduction Budget Support 
Programme 2003-2006 (PRBS 02), 2003
Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation 
German Development Institute  95
own claims in formulating conditionalities. Thus far only some success 
has been achieved in reaching agreements on a limited number of condi-
tionalities derived from partner PRSPs. The reason for this must be sought 
in divergent views on the significance and quality of individual indicators 
as well as in doubts as to the appropriateness of national targets.  
One important step on the road to a harmonized conditionality policy is to 
agree on reduced matrices for PRSP indicators, a step that has already 
been taken by some donors groups together with partner governments 
(Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia). The question as to which PRSP indi-
cators are regarded as especially relevant and thus incorporated in a matrix 
hinges in large measure on the priorities of individual donors. While the 
EC has expressed its preference for outcome indicators, the World Bank in 
particular has come out against conditioning budget support on outcome 
indicators. In its opinion governments cannot be held directly responsible 
for the outcome of policy measures at the user level. On the other hand, it 
notes, it is possible to identify and track efforts undertaken to implement 
reforms. The World Bank for this reason conditions the disbursement of its 
PRSCs on a limited number of process indicators, or so-called prior ac-
tions, which it wishes to see adopted by formalized donors groups. The 
result is that most matrices contain a broad spectrum of process condition-
alities and performance indicators, a development that tends both to un-
dercut the potential benefits of the performance-based approach and to 
weaken the incentives for a government to concentrate on outcomes. 
While the EC and the World Bank condition their disbursement of funds 
on a limited number of indicators, a small number of bilateral donors spec-
ify the matrix indicators to which they attach particular significance. A set 
of satisfactory overall results is often required for a continuation or dis-
bursement of aid. This entails the risk that incentives may be watered on 
and partner governments may not, in all cases, be held responsible for lack 
of progress on reforms. The PAF of the G15 Mozambique donor group 
contains some 60 indicators which are reviewed in the framework of an-
nual PRSP monitoring. Even today it has become apparent that in 2004 
good performance in some areas will be matched by moderate to poor 
performance in others. Even so, it is unlikely that bilateral donor contribu-
tions will be reduced for the following year, since most donors see the 
overall process as constructive and satisfactory. One approach that can be 
recommended as a means of coming up with a more differentiated relation 
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between outflows of funds and partner-government performance would be 
to define priorities in certain sectors and to adopt what is referred to as 
graduated response mechanisms of the kind we find in the EC's variable 
tranche. 
Most donor groups have committed themselves to deriving their PAF 
indicators and targets from partner PRSPs. One exception here is the con-
ditionalities set for public financial management. Most PRSPs deal only 
marginally with public financial management and the need for reform of 
financial administrations. A significant part of the political dialogue be-
tween donors and recipient governments for this reason extends to ques-
tions bound up with the quality of public financial management. 
On the whole, focusing donor contributions in the framework of donor 
groups has served to enhance the quality of the policy dialogue with part-
ner countries. While in the past individual donors, with their own projects 
and programs, proved unable to exert any significant influence on strategic 
development issues, the donor groups have developed into important dia-
logue forums in which recipient governments are able to coordinate their 
political priorities with the donor community. To cite an example, the 
Ethiopian government was long reluctant to discuss central issues of de-
velopment and public financial management with donors. The only excep-
tions were the World Bank and the IMF, which succeeded in setting ac-
cents in Ethiopia's development agenda. It was only in the framework of 
budget support that other donors – including the EC – succeeded in em-
barking on a strategic dialogue with the Ethiopian government. 
The complexity of the processes that need to be assessed and monitored in 
connection with budget support requires the donors to identify operational 
priorities. "Thematic working groups" on certain PRSP- or PFM- related 
fields of action (Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique) have proven their value 
in this context. In Ethiopia there are at present 14 working groups, two of 
which are concerned with budget-management issues. The G15 in Mo-
zambique breaks down into 23 working group and sub-working groups. 
This structure makes it possible for smaller donors to represent the donor 
group in PRS-related subareas and to play a significant role in shaping the 
political dialogue. As experience has shown, the weight of individual 
donors is not a direct function of the volume of the funds they provide; 
indeed, the thematic inputs provided by donor representatives may well 
prove equally important. As members of a donor group, donors that pro-
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vide relatively small financial contributions may find themselves in pos-
session of considerable leverage. One example here would be German FC 
in Ethiopia: Even though FC accounts for only a small percentage of the 
overall volume of German DC, it plays a key role when it comes to central 
issues bound up with budget planning and implementation. Even donors 
that are not directly involved in direct budget support, and are thus not 
members of the donors group, are included in discussions at the working-
group level. 
The EC plays an important role in many donor groups. Both in Mozam-
bique and in Ethiopia it can be seen as the group's lead donor. Together 
with the World Bank, it chairs the final negotiations with the partner gov-
ernments concerned and heads – among others – some (important) work-
ing groups on budget issues. The EC's input for the political dialogue and 
the individual working groups is seen in a highly positive light by the 
other donors involved, while assessments of the efficiency of the EC's 
specific financing modalities tend to differ. This goes in particular for the 
EC's outcome indicators and variable disbursement tranches, which some 
actors sees as undercutting the predictability of aid for partner countries. 
However, it is precisely in Mozambique that the EC's variable-tranche 
policy has led to a heightened outcome orientation in national policy. 
Other deficits, including e.g. insufficient alignment of the EC's budget 
support with the Ethiopian government's budget calendar, are attributable 
to the fact that the budget-support group was only recently constituted and 
still needs to fine-tune its procedures. 
5 Conclusions and recommendations 
5.1 General conclusions 
The central role played by a more markedly program oriented DC in 
reaching the MDGs has now been acknowledged in the international de-
velopment debate. In adopting the new approach to DC, however, substan-
tial differences have emerged between donors as regards the scope and the 
speed of the changes called for. Various donors, including the UK, the 
Netherlands, and the European Commission, are visibly moving toward 
program orientation. Other donors, on the other hand, are reluctant to 
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become involved in program-based approaches and remain skeptical about 
them. 
Motivation for the provision of budget support in the EC 
The transition to program-based approaches and budget support in the 
EC's DC has come about in connection with internal evaluations of the 
Community's development-policy instruments and programs as well as 
against the background of the ongoing international discussion. The prin-
ciple reason cited for providing budget support is to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of DC. In the EC's opinion, the following are particularly 
cogent reasons for providing budget support: 
— Budget support gives greater scope for partner ownership and self-
reliance. It serves to support strategies and programs worked out by 
partner countries themselves, and not, as previously, donor-
dominated projects. 
— The framework provided by budget aid allows the EC to take far 
more constructive influence on the formulation and implementation 
of partner policies than is the case with traditional project approaches. 
Since the funds provided go directly into the overall budget, the EC 
has a legitimate interest in the quality of public financial management 
and to take a hand in partner budget planning and implementation. 
— Budget support encourages the development of efficient public finan-
cial and administrative structures in partner countries and serves to 
improve accountability. 
— Budget support contributes to greater focus on results both among 
partners and within the EC. 
— Budget support is conducive to donor coordination. Embedding donor 
contributions in national strategies serves to reduce the great number 
of projects with different process sequences, reports, consultations, 
and negotiations. This serves to ease the burden on strained partner 
capacities and to reduce transaction costs for donors and recipients 
alike. 
In view of the high fiduciary risks involved in the provision of budget 
support, the EC accords high priority to improving the quality of public 
financial management in partner countries. Aside from preparation of a 
PRSP and adoption of a macroeconomic reform program coordinated with 
the BWIs, the EC has defined satisfactory quality of PFM as a general 
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precondition for the provision of budget support. These eligibility criteria 
are fundamentally in line with the preconditions set by other donors for 
budget support. Still, PFM practices continue to leave much to be desired. 
Central characteristics of the EC's budget-support concept 
With a view to ensuring that its eligibility criteria are met and that the 
benefits of budget support are fully realized, the EC developed a compre-
hensive program concept for budget support and incorporated it in the 
budget-support guidelines it adopted in 2002. 
EC's budget support is marked by the following central characteristics: 
— As a rule, EC's budget support is direct and untargeted. 
— Budget-support programs have multiyear terms (normally three 
years).  
— EC budget support is paid out in several tranches, with a distinction 
made between fixed and variable tranches. Normally, one fixed and 
one variable tranche is released each financial year. Disbursement is 
conditioned on the implementation of a macroeconomic reform pro-
gram as well as on good results on performance indicators. 
— The aim of budget support is to assist partner countries in implement-
ing their PRSPs. This requires the programs to be embedded materi-
ally and procedurally in national PRSP and budget calendars. 
— The EC's budget support replaces traditional ex ante conditionality 
with performance-based ex post conditionality. The link between per-
formance and disbursement is established through a graduated dis-
bursement mechanism. 
— Improvements in the quality of PFM has become a top priority in EC 
budget support programs. Donor coordination has become more im-
portant then ever before. 
Application of the guidelines on program implementation  
There is no point in trying to come up with a conclusive assessment of 
how well this approach works before several years of experience have 
been made. The same goes for tracking the anticipated effects, e.g. as far 
as ownership, reduction of transaction costs, etc. are concerned. Many 
programs designed along these lines are still in their early stages. Never-
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theless, some visible results are already emerging. Analysis of 30 budget 
support programs launched since 2000 revealed the following:  
— The transition from indirect, targeted budget support to a direct and 
untargeted provision has now been concluded. All budget-support 
programs approved by the EDF in 2003 involve direct, untargeted 
budget support. 
— There is a clear-cut trend toward pluriannual programs. All 2004 
budget support programs cover three years.This serves to increase the 
predictability of support and contributes to continuous reform proc-
esses in partner countries. 
— The model based on a combination of fixed and variable tranches is 
now generally accepted. In 2003, for the first time, all EC financing 
proposals for budget support provided for disbursement based on 
fixed and variable tranches. In 2003 nearly 50 % of programmed 
funds was earmarked for the variable "performance bonus." The other 
half of these funds are provided to partner countries in the forms of 
the fixed tranche. 
— There is scope to better align budget support programs with the 
PRSPs and budget process in partner countries. This applies in par-
ticular for the variable tranche, which is often calculated only after 
partner budgets have been prepared. Also, many tranches are dis-
bursed not at the beginning but toward the end of the financial year. 
But problems in embedding budget support in the budget calendar are 
not invariably due to the variable-tranche model, they are just as 
likely to be due to an insufficient dovetailing of the PRSP and budget 
processes in partner countries on the one hand as well as to the gener-
ally inadequate alignment of donor contributions with national pro- 
cess sequences on the other. In most partner countries the EC belongs 
to a group of budget-support donors. While these groups have largely 
centralized the consultations and negotiations conducted in connec-
tion with budget support, they have not yet sufficiently adapted their 
activities to national budget calendars.  
— The need to materially embed budget support in partner PRSs calls 
for program conditionalities that are derived from national strategies. 
Thus far the EC's conditionalities have not been comprehensively 
harmonized with national goals and objectives, a fact which is due, 
among other things, to difficulties partner countries have in formulat-
ing appropriate PRS indicators. 
Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation 
German Development Institute  101
— The use of performance-based ex post conditionality is making good 
headway, though there would be room to expand it. Even in 2003 
programs were still being approved that conditioned disbursement of 
the fixed tranche not only on macroeconomic reform programs but on 
other policy measures as well. In addition, the introduction of per-
formance-based elements in the variable tranche does not mean that 
all indicators used are in fact performance-based. The transition to 
performance-based conditionality is most evident in the education 
sector. 73.4 percent of the education indicators applied relate to out-
comes. In contrast, output indicators are still prevalent for assessing 
public budgets. Only two percent of the conditions for this sector are 
results-oriented. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that input indicators will 
be completely abandoned – nor would this be recommendable. There 
are, after all, difficulties in defining outcome-indicators in budget 
matters. 
— Linking payouts to performance in a gradual disbursement scheme 
has proved worthwhile. It has been possible to condition disburse-
ment on a balanced set of goals and objectives that neither strain nor 
underchallenge development-related partner capacities. On average, 
71 percent of the maximum variable amount has been disbursed so 
far. Initial experience shows that the variable tranches contribute to 
making partners more results-oriented. 
— There is still considerable room for improvement as regards assess-
ment of partner PFM. More attention should be devoted to both ex 
ante and continuous assessment of partner PFM systems. The same 
goes for the use of compliance tests prior to and during program im-
plementation, a practice that has thus far been provided for in only a 
very limited number of programs. 
— The task of overall assessment of budget management and provision 
of flanking support for comprehensive reforms in this sector cannot 
be the sole responsibility of the EC; indeed, it calls for concerted ac-
tion on the part of all donors. Assessment and documentation of pro-
gress on reforms must be coordinated with donors of budget support 
as a means of ensuring that future decisions and measures are under-
taken on the basis of precise knowledge of the situations actually 
given.  
— Despite considerable progress, donor coordination remains a chal-
lenge. The possibilities and limitations of donor coordination should 
be accorded more attention in program planning and made more 
transparent in financing proposals. It is essential to continuously sup-
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port and promote donor coordination during the course of program 
implementation. As initial experiences indicate, the EC is willing to 
relinquish some of its influence in favor of a coordinated approach. 
The other donors see in the EC an important and reliable lead donor 
in the provision of budget support. 
5.2 Conclusions for German development cooperation 
Conclusions on the development cooperation Germany provides as a  
bilateral donor 
German DC is likely to become more involved in PGF in the near future. 
This goes for contributions to basket financing as well as for sector budget 
support and general budget support. At present the German TC/FC guide-
lines provide only for cofinancing of the World Bank's PRSCs. While 
German participation in multidonor budget support groups without a close 
link to a PRSC is not formally intended, in practice it is possible after 
consultation with the ministries concerned. Cofinancing of EC Budget 
support programs in terms of PRSC cofinancing is neither mentioned in 
the TC/FC guidelines nor practiced. 
As a bilateral donor, Germany should look into the possibility of cooperat-
ing more closely with the EC. In donor groups the EC has proven to be a 
reliable and competent lead partner in the field of budget support. The 
criteria on which it bases its provision of budget support are in line with 
those of other donors, and as a general rule these criteria are conscien-
tiously observed. Viewed against this background, it would be reasonable 
to support an enlargement of Germany's engagement to include cofinanc-
ing of EC budget support programs, especially in light of the fact that 
Germany is in a position to wield considerable influence on program ap-
provals at EDF meetings. 
However, it would be important to examine whether and to what extent the 
concept of cofinancing might be abandoned in favor of an autonomous 
participation of German DC in budget support programs. In the view of 
political decision-makers, it is in particular the high fiduciary risks in-
volved in the provision of budget support that speak against any enlarge-
ment of general budget support and for restriction to PRSC cofinancing. 
Despite the risks assumed, this reticence must be regarded with a critical 
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eye in view of the major leverage effects that an individual donor can 
achieve with the instrument of budget support. 
As a member of a donor group of budget-support donors, individual do-
nors can play an important role in shaping the policy dialogue with recipi-
ent governments. While in the past each donor, with his own projects and 
programs, could wield little influence on strategic policy issues, budget 
support donor groups have developed into important dialogue forums in 
which recipient governments are able to coordinate their political priorities 
with the donor community.  
— As experience shows, the importance of the role played by individual 
donors within a donor group depends less on the volume of the funds 
they provide than on the content-level contributions made by donor 
representatives. "Small" donors may very well represent a donor 
group in subfield of PRSs and exert the influence of a lead donor in 
the fields for which they are responsible. 
— One example of a "small" donor playing a lead role in budget support 
is German's FC in Ethiopia: Even though German FC provides only a 
small percentage of the overall volume of budget support involved, it 
plays a lead role in central issues of budget planning and implementa-
tion.  
— In principle, the objective of donor groups is to avoid assuming the 
role of exclusive discussion forums and to get other, uncommitted 
donors involved in the content-level dialogue with partners (e.g. 
USAID in promotion of the private sector in Mozambique). Still, 
consultations with partner governments are restricted to a more or 
less small circle of donor representatives. This serves to reduce trans-
action costs for donors and recipients alike and can, in this sense, be 
seen as an approach that is highly reasonable in terms of development 
policy. Nonmembers of a donor group are unable to use their in-
volvement in given areas to stake out a claim to greater involvement 
in negotiations if they are unwilling to bear a share of the risks en-
tailed by budget support. 
The complexity of the processes that need to be assessed in the framework 
of the provision of budget support makes it essential that German DC act 
in the framework of formalized donor groups. What concrete shape should 
be given to a German participation in donor groups, and whether delegated 
cooperation in the sense of a closer alignment to the EC's budget-support 
program might prove reasonable – these are questions that would have to 
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be answered on a case-by-case basis. Against the background of the EC's 
experiences, we can derive the following recommendations for German 
DC: 
— Even for "small" budget-support donors it is important to reflect on 
possible links between disbursement and performance and to seek to 
develop a graduated system of allocation. The practice of defining 
generally satisfactory recipient performance as the key criterion for 
the disbursement of a complete tranche is not particularly well suited 
to correcting faulty developments in sectors in which little progress 
has been made.  
— In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of aid, it would 
appear reasonable to concentrate on performance indicators. Gener-
ally, individual donors lack the human resources needed to assess and 
monitor the implementation of policy measures and their potential 
impacts at the user level. Clearly measurable performance-based con-
ditionalities contribute instead to arriving at more objective dis-
bursement decisions. 
— However, the choice of performance indicators and the evaluation of 
goals and objectives set by recipient governments call for active par-
ticipation in discussions bearing on developments in the sectors con-
cerned. One question that needs to be clarified is whether German DC 
is in a position to mobilize the necessary capacities on the ground, or 
whether – e.g. – it might be more reasonable to adopt, to one extent 
or another, the indicators used by the EC. A "delegated" cooperation 
in the sense of a close orientation to the EC budget-support program 
would be recommendable above all in countries that are not priority 
partner countries of German DC.  
— The task of providing comprehensive assessments of recipients’ pub-
lic financial management systems requires donors to develop exper-
tise. German DC should thus intensify its efforts to build capacities in 
the field of public budgets and financial management, not least with a 
view to becoming involved in important thematic fields within donor 
groups.  
— In order to effectively take part in the policy dialogue and accompany 
reform processes in recipient countries, it would be recommendable 
to strengthen German DC on the ground by developing expertise on 
the PRSP process, public financial management, and macroeconomic 
issues in recipient countries. Embassy-level DC counselors, who are 
responsible for coordinating German DC in recipient countries, may 
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well be overtaxed by this task. Together with the BMZ, the German 
implementing agencies should develop concepts suited to adapting 
their external structures to the new challenges. Together with the 
BMZ, the German implementing agencies should develop concepts 
suited to adapting their external structures to the new challenges. This 
goes in particular for the priority partner countries of German DC. 
The KfW pilot project in Kenya, which provides an expert to accom-
pany several PRSC cofinancing operations, is a step in this direction. 
The BMZ should likewise step up its efforts to build and enlarge its 
know-how on the issue complexes referred to above and to assign re-
sponsibilities in a clear-cut fashion (e.g. as far as PGF issues are con-
cerned). 
Conclusions regarding Germany's role as a member state in assessing the 
EC's budget-support programs 
As a EU member state, Germany has a voice in deciding on EC budget 
support approvals, prior to which it receives all financing proposals for 
comments. If they are to review these financing proposals on budget sup-
port in a more targeted way, staff of both the BMZ and the German im-
plementing agencies must have sound knowledge of the EC's budget-
support concept. Particular attention should be accorded to assessing the 
eligibility criteria that a partner country has to meet to qualify for budget 
support. Ultimately, this assessment has implications for bilateral German 
DC since it would be difficult to question a country's eligibility for budget 
support at the bilateral level once it had been deemed eligible for budget 
support at the supranational level.  
In contrast to the more general eligibility decision, assessing the quality of 
individual program elements of the EC's budget-support financing is only 
possible and reasonable on the basis of specific country knowledge. In 
particular, the task of assessing indicators and targets requires information 
that goes beyond knowledge of the EC's financing proposals, and acquir-
ing such data is often a costly and time-consuming effort. The desire to 
assess, and if need be to influence, the design of individual programs 
should therefore be weighed critically with a view to input and yield. 
Unlike program approval, program implementation is not a subject ad-
dressed at EDF meetings. If member states are to have at least rudimentary 
knowledge of program implementation, it would make sense for the to be 
provided with the periodical (e.g. semiannual) disbursement data, particu-
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larly with data regarding the calculation of the variable tranche. Germany 
should seek to ensure that the EC in fact makes this information available. 
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Annex 1: TOR for the study: Budget Support in the EC's  
 Development Cooperation 
Background 
Budget support (general budget support, sector budget support) has greatly 
increased in the past few years, above all within the framework of the 
European Development Fund (EDF), and most recently accounted for 
more than 20 % of the new credit commitments. In the case of the other 
regional programs budget support has been a tried and tested instrument in 
some cases (MEDA, approx. 30 %) or is still in its infancy (Asia and Latin 
America – also as result of the ALA ordinance that currently applies). The 
other programmes (TACIS, CARDS, Phare) only partially envisage the 
provision of budget aid. Budget support has also gained importance among 
other bi- and multilateral donors (Great Britain, Netherlands, World Bank 
etc.). As BS is a partnership based instrument for delivering resources to a 
country a co-ordinated effort between the donors is necessary. Accord-
ingly, DAC launched a comprehensive evaluability study of budget sup-
port to be concluded by October 05. The main objective of the DAC 
evaluation is an analysis of the effectiveness of the instrument “budget 
support” whereas this survey (“Budget aid based on EC aid”) aims at an 
analysis of the performance of the donor EU in its application of budget 
aid. Thus, the focus of the survey is set on the examination of internal 
processes. 
The awarding of budget support on the part of the Commission is criticised 
by the most varied parties, and two main arguments constantly arise:  
(a) According to them budget support was not prepared sufficiently well 
by the Commission, necessary inspections were not implemented in a 
professional manner. Consequently the support was granted although 
the requirements on the part of the recipients that are regarded interna-
tionally as being the standard (budgetary procedures; financial policy, 
financial control) had not actually been fulfilled; 
(b) The main motive for the granting of budget support is to accelerate 
the outflow of funds. 
However, the evidence corroborating this criticism is very scanty. For 
example the GTZ is one of the prominent critics of the Commission’s 
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course of action in Germany, but in all its statements to the BMZ it has 
attested a vote of confidence for all the Commission’s budget support 
proposals that it has inspected. All the other, in some cases, strong criti-
cism is frequently not based on facts. 
Objective of the survey 
The survey has two concrete aims: First, the results of the survey should 
be used for the BMZ’s (German Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development) dialogue with the Parliament, with the preparing 
organisations and the interested public. In order to do so an examination of 
the EDF’s financing should show if the allegations to the Commission 
expressed above might be justified. Secondly, the results of the survey 
should help the BMZ to examine systematically the particular financing 
proposals. The implementation agencies GTZ and KfW will contribute to 
this examination and a monitoring-pattern will be developed. In this con-
text it should also be examined how far the instrument budget support 
represents an integrative part at the planning of DC within the scope of the 
Country- and Regional strategies as well as in terms of the attainability of 
the PRS in a country. 
The expert report should also serve as the basis for the BMZ, in order to 
active address the issue of budget support (BS) with the COM and if nec-
essary – in cooperation with other member states (F, UK and like-minded 
states) if possible – to bring about the necessary changes. In this process 
the EDF is to the fore. The following issues should be addressed in detail 
in the course of the investigation: 
(a) Summary with respect to all the budget support of the COM promised 
up to now (as of 2000) and categorisation based on groups (general 
BS; sector BS etc.). 
(b) Changes (2000-2003) in the structuring of the budget support with 
respect to the conditions; tranches and triggers; etc. 
(c) Analysis and evaluation of the (internal) inspection regulations for the 
COM’s budget supports (also comparison with other institutions, e.g. 
WB, BMZ, DFID – in particular also a comparison with the country-
specific minimum requirements drafted by the BMZ, observation of 
the manual). 
Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation 
German Development Institute  121
(d) Planning of budget support within the framework of country and re-
gional strategies as part of an instrument in order to achieve the coun-
try-specific fight against poverty objectives. 
(e) Examination of evaluations reports, if present, with respect to the 
COM’s budget support; 
(f) Budget support and linked “Donor clubs” with respect to the coordi-
nation and complementary nature as well as a political dialogue. 
(g) Monitoring practice in the case of EU budget support (including prac-
tice when dealing with triggers). 
(h) Evaluation system on the part of the COM of individual SAFs and the 
tool as a whole. 
(i) The political dimension of the allocation of budget aid: The EU’s DC 
contains an explicitly political dimension based on articles 96 and 97 
of the Cotonou Agreement that envisions sanctions in the case of hu-
man rights violation, lack of democracy and legal security as well as 
corruption. It has to be examined in which way these criteria are ap-
plied at budget support. 
The results of the expert report are of particular significance in terms of 
our objective of also increasingly cooperating with the COM regarding the 
instrument of community funding in the future against the backdrop of 
programme-oriented cooperation: Is COM a competent and reliable “lead 
partner” in the area of budget support? Up to now there has only been one 
reliable case (Mozambique). There is already a group of donors amongst 
the European bilateral donors, which closely cooperates with COM in the 
area of budget support and has a rotating chairmanship. The findings made 
here should play a significant part during the investigation. 
Budget support is also an important issue for the German bilateral eco-
nomic cooperation and development. The BMS stated its position in its 
paper “Participation in Joint Financing with Other Donors within the 
Framework of Programme-oriented Development Cooperation of 
30.11.2001“. An investigation of the “Budget support within the context of 
community support” would investigate additional aspects, which are also 
of significance for the future orientation of the tools of German state eco-
nomic cooperation and development, above all set against the backdrop of 
the necessity of the donor procedures harmonised within the Community. 
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Annex 2: Eligibility criteria for EC budget support: MEDA  
 Regulation and Cotonou Agreement 
Regulation (MEDA) No 2698/2000 (MEDA II), Annex II, Point 1. b) 
The following eligibility criteria must be met: 
— the country concerned must undertake a reform programme approved by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions or implement programmes recognized as analo-
gous, in coordination with those institutions, but not necessarily financially 
supported by them, in accordance with the scope and effectiveness of the re-
forms;  
— account must be taken of the economic situation of the country, at the macro-
economic level, (indebtedness, cost of debt-servicing, the balance of pay-
ments, the budget situation, the monetary situation, the level of per capita in-
come and the unemployment level) and at the level of sectoral reforms, with 
a view to creating a free trade area with the European Community. 
Article 61 (2) of the Cotonou Agreement: 
Direct budgetary assistance in support of macroeconomic or sectoral reforms shall 
be granted where: 
a) public expenditure management is sufficiently transparent, accountable and 
effective; 
b) well defined macroeconomic or sectoral policies established by the country 
itself and agreed to by its main donors are in place; and 
c) public procurement is open and transparent. 
Article 67 of the Cotonou Agreement: 
(1) The Agreement shall provide support for macroeconomic and sectoral re-
forms implemented by the ACP States. In this framework, the Parties shall 
ensure that adjustment is economically viable and socially and politically 
bearable. Support shall be given in the context of a joint assessment between 
the Community and the ACP State concerned on the reform measures being 
undertaken or contemplated either at macroeconomic or sectoral level, and 
permit an overall evaluation of the reform efforts. Quick disbursement shall 
be an important feature of support programmes. 
(3) The ACP State undertaking or contemplating reform at the macroeconomic 
or sectoral level shall be eligible for structural adjustment assistance, giving 
consideration to the regional context, their effectiveness and the likely impact 
on the economic, social and political dimension of development and on eco-
nomic an social hardships being experienced. 
(4) The ACP States undertaking reform programmes that are acknowledged and 
 supported at least by the principal multilateral donors, or that are agreed with 
 such donors but not necessarily financially supported by them, shall be 
 treated as having automatically satisfied the requirements for adjustment as
 sistance. 
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Annex 3: EC budget-support approvals, 1999–2003, and predicted appro-
 vals vor 2004–2005 (in € million), based on financing agreements 
Approvals  Forecast  
Recipient country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 2004 2005 Total
Benin 0 27.0 23.4 0 55.0 105.4 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 39.2 9.8 24.2 125.0 0 198.2 0 70.0 70.0
Burundi 0 0 0 22.6 0 22.6 36.0 0 36.0
Cameroon 0 0 19.5 0 0 19.5 0 0 0
Cape Verdi Islands   0 0 0 12.1 0 12.1 5.8 0 5.8
CAR 6.5 0 26.4 0 0 32.9 0 20.0 20.0
Chad 9.2 37.1 0 0 50.0 96.3 0 0 0
Congo 0 0 0 0 106.0 106.0 0 0 0
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 11.1 0 0 11.1 0 0 0
Djibouti 0 10.0 0 0 0 10.0 12.8 0 12.8
Ethiopia 0 0 24.4 38.3 0 62.7 95.0 0 95.0
Gabon 0 0 4.9 0 0 4.9 0 0 0
Gambia 0 9.2 4.3 0 0 13.5 0 0 0
Ghana 10.6 0 38.4 42.8 0 91.8 60.0 0 60.0
Guinea 0 0 0 11.0 0 11.0 0 35.0 35.0
Guinea Bissau  0 15.8 1.5 0 0 17.3 0 0 0
Guyana 5.4 0 0 0 0 5.4 23.3 0 23.3
Jamaica  9.0 0 21.7 0 30.0 60.7 25.0 0 25.0
Kenya 0 35.0 0 0 0 35.0 120.0 0 120.0
Lesotho 0 0 18.5 0 0 18.5 0 46.2 46.2
Madagascar 0 0 0 70.0 0 70.0 35.0 35.0 70.0
Malawi 52.1 0 0 0 0 52.1 36.0 0 36.0
Mali 37.0 0 6.0 25.8 132.9 201.7 0 0 0
Mauritania 0 0 18.1 0 0 18.1 3.6 0 3.6
Mozambique 0 13.5 57.1 168.0 16.4 255.0 0 0 0
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Niger 0 24.3 3.2 20.0 90.0 137.5 0 0 0
Papua New Guinea 0 10.4 0 0 0 10.4 0 0 0
Rwanda 24.6 1.2 0 0 50.0 75.8 0 0 0
Sao Tomé and Principe  0 0 2.6 0 0 2.6 0 0 0
Senegal  39.1 0 5.2 0 0 44.3 53.0 0 53.0
Sierra Leone 0 20.6 0 0 0 20.6 50.0 0 50.0
Tanzania 0 0 76.1 0 114.0 190.1 0 0 0
Uganda 44.3 74.7 0 0 119.0 99.0 0 99.0
Vanuatu 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 1.7 0 1.7
Zambia 0 59.6 0 0 128.5 188.1 0 0 0
  276.9 348.2 386.5 535.6 772.8 2320.1 656.3 206.2 862.4
Source: Own presentation, based on EC (2004, Annex 1) 
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Annex 4: EDF budget-support approvals, 1999–2003 (in € million), 
 based on financing proposals 
Recipient country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Benin 29.4 18.8 0 0 55.0 103.2
Burkina Faso 49.0 23.5 0 125.0 0 197.5
Burundi 0 0 0 22.6 0 22.6
Cameroon 0 19.5 0 0 0 19.5
Cape Verde Islands 15.0 0.0 12.1 0 0 27.1
CAR 6.5 26.4 0 0 117.0 149.9
Chad 9.2 37.1 0 50.0 0 96.3
Congo 0 0 0 0 105.0 105.0
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 12.8 0 0 12.8
Djibouti 0 10.0 0 0 0 10
Ethiopia 0 0 25.7 44.0 95.0 164.7
Gabon 0 0 4.9 0 0 4.9
Gambia 0 13.5 0 0 0 13.5
Ghana 49.0 0.0 42.8 0 0 91.8
Guinea 0 0 11.0 0 0 11.0
Guinea Bissau 0 17.2 0 0 0 17.2
Guyana 5.4 0 0 0 0 5.4
Haiti 21.3 0 0 0 0 21.3
Jamaica 34.0 6.0 21.7 30.0 0 91.7
Kenya 0 35.0 0 0 0 35.0
Lesotho 0 18.5 0 0 0 18.5
Madagascar 50.0 0 0 70.0 0 120.0
Malawi 52.1 0 0 0 0 52.1
Mali 37.0 0 6.0 25.8 132.9 201.7
Mauritania 0 18.3 0 0 0 18.3
Mozambique 0 79.2 0 151.6 16.4 247.2
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Niger 0 37.9 0 20.0 90.0 147.0
Papua New Guinea 0 10.4 0 0 0 10.4
Rwanda 0 59.6 0 0 55.1 114.7
Sao Tomé und Principe  0 2.8 0 0 0 2.8
Senegal1 39.1 0 5.2 0 0 44.3
Sierra Leone 0 20.6 76.1 0 0 96.7
Solomon Islands 4.0 0 0 0 0 4.0
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 114.0 114.0
Trinidad und Tobago 0 6.0 0 0 0 6.0
Uganda 0 74.7 0 0 0 74.7
Zambia 0 109.6 0 0 0 109.6
        
  400.9 644.7 218.3 539.0 780.4 2582.4
Source: EDF protocols and financing proposals on budget support, 1999–2003  
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Annex 5: EC disbursements of budget support, 1999–2003, and predicted 
 disbursements for 2004–2005 (in € million), based on financing 
 agreements 
Disbursements Forecast 
Recipient country  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 2004 2005 Total 
Benin 7.5 11.6 26.2 5.0 4.3 54.6 19.2 12.3 31.5
Burkina Faso 19.0 27.2 18.9 24.4 37.8 127.3 52.5 20.0 72.5
Burundi 0 0 0 0 8.0 8.0 36.5 10.0 46.5
Cameroon 0 10.0 0 0 8.9 18.9 9.0 0 9.0
Cape Verde Islands 0 0 0 2.0 9.0 11.0 5.5 0 5.5
CAR 6.5 0.0 11.5 0 0 18.0 12.0 10.0 22.0
Chad 0 11.1 15.8 22.4 0 49.3 38.0 8.0 46.0
Congo 0 0 0 5.0 4.6 9.6 106.0 0 106.0
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 0 5.2 0 5.2 0 0 0
Djibouti 4.7 1.0 0 0 4.5 10.2 4.0 0 4.0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 25.8 10.7 36.5 45.0 30.0 75.0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.2 2.0 4.2
Gambia 0 5.0 0 0 0 5.0 4.0 0 4.0
Ghana 10.5 0 0 22.2 25.6 58.2 45.9 24.0 69.9
Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.4 10.0 20.4
Guinea Bissau 0 0 5.4 0 0 5.4 10.3 0 10.3
Guyana 2.1 0 0 0 0 2.1 6.0 8.0 14.0
Jamaica  0 2.0 17.0 6.4 0 25.4 37.0 10.0 47.0
Kenya 0 0 17.0 0 0 17.0 50.0 50.0 100.0
Lesotho 0 0 0 6.0 3.0 9.0 0 15.0 15.0
Madagascar 15.0 14.0 19.7 35.0 34.5 118.2 20.0 17.8 37.8
Malawi 20.0 0 16.0 0 0 36.0 30.5 15.0 45.5
Mali 6.6 7.4 10.4 15.0 32.9 72.3 29.6 29.3 58.9
Mauritania 10.7 0 0 5.5 5.7 21.9 4.5 3.6 8.1
Mozambique 0 57.4 65.0 30.6 41.0 194.0 50.0 42.0 92.0
Niger 0 0 13.0 16.6 24.3 53.4 35.0 35.0 70.0
Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 11.0 14.6 21.8 27.5 25.0 99.9 20.0 15.5 35.5
Sao Tomé and Principe 0 0 1.5 0 1.0 2.5 0 0 0
Senegal  2.8 0 5.2 0 3.8 11.8 35.3 15.0 50.3
Sierra Leone 0 9.7 16.6 0 0 26.3 18.4 30.0 48.4
Tanzania 35.0 0.0 25.4 37.5 68.5 166.4 31.0 38.0 69.0
Uganda 15.0 71.8 0 24.5 24.5 135.8 24.5 33.0 57.5
Vanuatu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 1.0 1.7
Zambia 47.6 0 12.0 69.0 28.7 157.2 37.0 31.0 68.0
 Total 214.0 242.7 318.3 385.5 406.2 1566.2 829.9 515.6 1345.5
Source: Own presentation, based on EC (2004, Annex 1) 
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Annex 6: Calculation of a variable tranche: the example of Ethiopia 
 Target Result Source Re-
marks 
Score 
by 
Delega-
tion 
Score 
by 
MO-
FED 
Sug-
gested 
disburse-
ment in 
Mio. 
Euro 
Health        
Under 5 DTP3 
vaccination 
cover 
From 
42 % to 
45 % 
51.5 % MOH Data 
collect-
ed per 
ultimo 
July 
2002 
1 1  
Health centers 
+ posts util. 
rate 
From 
27 % to 
29 % 
23 % JRM 
03 
Idem 
above 
0 0  
Ante-natal 
care coverage 
From 
34 % to 
38 % 
34.1 % MOH  0 0  
Education        
Primary girls 
enrolment rate 
From 
40.7% 
to 47% 
51.2% JRM 
03 
 1 1  
Grade 1 drop-
out rate 
From 
27.9 % 
to 24 %
27.5 % JRM 
03 
 0 0  
Share of 
qualified 
teachers 
From 
23.9 % 
to 45 %
33.1 % MOE  0.5 0.5  
Roads        
Share of roads 
in acceptable 
condition 
From 
57 % to 
61 % 
60 % RSDPII 
(03-
2003) 
March 
2003: 
62 % 
1 1  
Road Network 
Density  
(Index A) 
From 
27.7 % 
to  
28.5 % 
28.6 % RSDPII 
(03-
2003) 
 1 1  
Subtotal     4.5 
(56 %) 
4.5 
(56 %) 
4.5 
(of 8) 
PFM        
Federal/Reg. 
Budget conso-
lidated 
Federal 
level + 1 
region 
Final 
not yet 
ready 
MO-
FED 
 0.5 0.5  
Budget Support in the EC’s Development Cooperation 
German Development Institute  129
 
 
Food security 
included in 
budget 
FS 
Budget 
line + 
FA 
Annex 
FS 
Budget 
line: 
yes; FA 
Annex: 
no 
MO-
FED 
 0.5 0.5  
3 years rolling 
MEFF/PEP 
Appro-
ved by 
Council 
MEFF 
has 
been 
pre-
pared; 
not PEP 
MO-
FED 
 0.5 0.5  
Backlog of 
accounts 
reduced 
Regions 
1 year 
backlog 
Back-
log has 
been 
reduced 
MO-
FED 
 1 1  
Accoun-
tants/Internal 
auditors  
trained 
From 
4.600 to 
6.000 
5.891 MO-
FED 
200 to 
be 
trained 
in 
second 
quarter 
2003 
1 1  
Parliament 
members 
trained 
Trai-
ning 
started 
400 MP 
have 
been 
trained 
MO-
FED 
 1 1  
Sub-total     4.5 
(75 %) 
4.5 
(75 %) 
4.5 
(of 6) 
PSD        
Land titles  
to S/M busi-
nesses 
2001/02 
increase 
by  
15 % 
Land 
has 
been al-
located. 
% to 
S/M un-
known 
MOTI  0.5 1  
New/restructur
es laws and 
policies 
Five in 
2002 
9 MOTI  1 1  
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New/revised 
regulati-
ons/procedures 
Eight 
in 2002 
2 MOTI  0.5 1  
1. SUB- 
    TOTAL 
    2  
(66 %) 
3  
(100 %)
1.65  
(of 2.5) 
2. TOTAL     11 12 10.65 
(of 16.5)
*Based on the Delegation's assessment 
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